


United States Army War College

Department of National Security and Strategy

National Security Policy and Strategy



Course Directive

AY18

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the U.S. Army War College. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army.



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**NS2201 – National Security Policy and Strategy
Academic Year 2018**



A. COURSE OVERVIEW.

...For many decades, we've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; we've defended other nations' borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.

We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon. One by one, the factories shuttered and left our shores, with not even a thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind. The wealth of our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed across the entire world.

But that is the past. And now we are looking only to the future. We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power.

From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it's going to be America First.

Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs, will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.

President Donald J. Trump
Inaugural Remarks, 20 January 2017

A.1. GENERAL.

A.1.a. The National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) course focuses on national security policies and the strategies that put them into operation. It examines the environment – both international and domestic – in which policy and strategy

formulation occurs, the actors and institutions that formulate policy and strategy, and the instruments of power the United States employs to pursue its national security policy and strategy objectives. The course concludes with an examination of current and near-future U.S. national security policy and strategy, focusing on the role played by national strategic documents to include the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Strategy Review (formerly known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)), and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

A.1.b. During NSPS, the Department of National Security and Strategy (DNSS) faculty's goal is to provide a positive adult learning environment through seminar discussions, readings, case studies, guest lectures, and question and answer periods. Throughout the course, the faculty will challenge students to evaluate complex national security issues that are often characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty using critical, creative, ethical, and systemic thought processes, as well as historical/contextual reflection and analysis.

A.1.c. The synthesis, analysis, evaluation and application of national security policy, and the military's role within the interagency decision-making process, conform to no prescribed doctrine. Strategic thinking requires creativity as well as discipline in grappling with the complex and dynamic matters of policy, strategy, and the use of national power to promote and protect national interests. National security strategists in the 21st Century must effectively operate in a complex, ambiguous and rapidly-changing environment. Strategists must be able to integrate the multiple dimensions of the global environment, as well as factors such as culture, international and domestic politics, economics, public policy, and technology. Upon completion of the NSPS course, students will be better able to analyze complex and ambiguous national security issues, providing a solid foundation for their prospective service at the strategic level.

A.2. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of the NSPS course is to develop senior military and civilian leaders who understand the art and practice of policy and strategy formulation in achieving national security objectives in the current and emerging global environment.

A.3. **OUTCOMES.** The NSPS course outcomes are:

A.3.a. Analyze the process of national security policy and strategy formulation and the major factors that influence this process.

A.3.b. Analyze and understand contemporary and emerging international security challenges and their impact on the national security agenda.

A.3.c. Synthesize key concepts, tools, and processes in the development of appropriate policy and strategy responses to national security challenges facing the United States in the 21st Century international security environment.

A.4. COURSE STRUCTURE AND KEY QUESTIONS.

The course is divided into four blocks, each of which revolves around one or more key questions in the national security decision-making process.

A.4.a. Block I: The National Security Environment and Decision-Making Models. The first block provides a conceptual foundation for understanding national security decision-making. Lessons in this block examine the key concepts underpinning national security policy and strategy, the environments – both international and domestic – in which policy and strategy formulation take place, and examine a set of decision-making models that attempt to explain why governmental decision-making often deviates from a purely rational process that produces value-maximizing decisions. Block I of the course ends with a case study that examines the development of NSC-68, the document that articulated and defended the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Questions examined in Block I include:

A.4.a.1. How should national security be defined and what national interests flow from this definition?

A.4.a.2. How are policy and strategy defined and what is the relationship between them?

A.4.a.3. What are the key factors in the contemporary international environment that shape U.S. national security policy and strategy?

A.4.a.4. How do historical experience and the characteristics of the U.S. political system influence U.S. national security policy and strategy?

A.4.a.5. What influence do bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, and the characteristics of individual decision-makers have on national security policy and strategy?

A.4.b. Block II: National Security Actors and Institutions. The second block of the course examines the key actors and institutions in the national-security decision-making process. Among the actors and institutions examined are the President, the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council, the Congress, interest groups, and the Washington, D.C.-based military establishment of the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This block examines how these actors and institutions interact to formulate and implement national security policy and strategy. A key insight of this block is that interaction among these actors and institutions is dynamic - sometimes cooperative and sometimes competitive – with shifting coalitions of actors shaping policy and strategy, and personalities often playing a significant role. Block II ends with a case study on the U.S. decision to escalate the war in Vietnam, in which students play the roles of key actors in that process. Questions examined in Block II include:

A.4.b.1. Who are the key actors—whether individuals or institutions—in the national security community and what factors shape interaction among them?

A.4.b.2. How do civilian and military roles in the national security decision-making process differ, and what is the proper role of the military in this process?

A.4.b.3. What are the characteristics of the interagency process (as it has developed over the past 60-plus years) in the formulation and implementation of national security policy and strategy?

A.4.c. Block III: Instruments of National Power. The third block of the course examines the instruments of national power and how the United States uses them to achieve its national security objectives. Lessons in this block provide an overview of the instruments of diplomacy, information, military and economic power, and then examine how the U.S. uses these instruments during times of peace, crisis and conflict. A key insight of Block III is that the nation uses the instruments of power in an integrated manner – while one instrument may dominate in a given situation, the other instruments are also engaged in support of U.S. objectives in that situation. Questions examined in Block III include:

A.4.c.1. What are the instruments of U.S. national power and what are their relationships with one another?

A.4.c.2. What are the key characteristics of each instrument of power and what considerations guide its use?

A.4.c.3. How might the United States most effectively wield its national power to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century?

A.4.d. Block IV: Contemporary American Grand Strategy. The fourth and final block of the course examines national security policy and strategy in the 21st Century. The lessons of this block examine key U.S. national security documents, survey the contemporary global security environment and the issues that dominate it, and examine competing visions for 21st Century U.S. grand strategy. Questions examined in Block IV include:

A.4.d.1. In light of current circumstances, and projected forces and trends for the future, what national security priorities do you think should be reflected in national-level strategy documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy Review, and National Military Strategy)?

A.4.d.2. What types of national security policies and strategies will most effectively advance U.S. national interests over the next 10-20 years?

A.4.d.3. What lessons on the formulation and implementation of national security policy and strategy can be drawn from the study of major national security decisions in U.S. history?

A.5. SCOPE.

A.5.a. The national security professional should be as flexible, adaptable, and capable as the challenges our nation faces. During the National Security Policy and Strategy course, students should expect to do something that may appear paradoxical: to think clearly about ambiguous problems arising from complex circumstances. We will analyze and evaluate these problems from the perspective of those occupying the highest national security positions in our government—both civilian and military. Despite the uncertainty of issues and circumstances, students will be expected to offer options/solutions even when no obvious correct answer seems to emerge. This is no small task; however, it can be rewarding when approached with a creative, critical, and informed outlook. What follows is a discussion of a key aspect of the course: the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework.

A.5.a.1. The Strategy Formulation Framework (Figure 1) offers one way to conceptualize the overall objectives of this course. This framework is examined in detail in Appendix I of this document. The central part of the framework depicts a logical approach to organizing our thoughts regarding strategy formulation. Policy flows from the path of U.S. historical development and the continuing political process. It is derived from our nation's enduring beliefs, ethics, values, and previous choices. Policy may be defined as broad guidance that articulates national interests in the context of the strategic environment. National policy provides the focus for strategy formulation. Strategy at the highest level of decision-making is often referred to as Grand Strategy, which may be defined as the use of all instruments of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America's role in the world that will best achieve national objectives. However, it is important to remember that all strategy is a calculation of ways and means directed towards the accomplishment of ends, balanced against a continuous assessment of risk.

Strategy Formulation Framework




Figure 1

A.5.a.2. Evolving from U.S. history and practice, strategy formulation begins with an understanding of the nation's purpose, expressed through its values, beliefs, and ethics. National values, based on the nation's enduring beliefs and ethics, significantly influence the identification of national interests. Having derived national interests, the strategist can then conduct an appraisal of the challenges and opportunities that

affect these interests—as well as the nation’s ability to promote and protect them. The core national interests of the United States have historically revolved around the security of the United States, its citizens, and its allies; economic well-being; a stable international order; and the promotion of national values. However, the strategist must understand that these core interests, though enduring, may be influenced by the history of the U.S., the current context of the times, the domestic mood, and the international security climate.

A.5.a.3. A strategist should base an effective strategic appraisal on a realistic understanding of the international and domestic environments, and an analysis of the many trends and forces operating in those environments (depicted in the boxes on the left and right sides of the framework diagram). Based on this appraisal, political leaders, but especially the President of the United States, should articulate a vision of the nation’s role in the world. From this vision, key departmental and agency leaders should define that vision more completely, through a more detailed examination of national interests. As part of this process, the President and his principal advisors should determine national security policy objectives and develop a national security strategy for employing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—to achieve national security policy objectives. Strategists should devise specific strategies intended to achieve a range of national policy objectives around the globe and address issues of national importance. This process is a colossal undertaking because the security environment, with its international and domestic components, is constantly in flux. Events and other factors influence policy and strategy time and again. Consequently, assessing risk as part of the strategy formulation process becomes another critical element.

A.5.a.4. An essential analysis for policymakers and strategists to conduct is a risk assessment that can determine suitability (Will the strategy achieve or contribute usefully to the national policy objectives?), acceptability (Does the strategy accord with the preferences of key audiences? Is it legal? Ethical? Are costs likely to be borne?), and feasibility (Do we have the means to execute the strategy?). Additionally, this analysis is used to identify and assess the possible second- and third-order effects involved in implementing the strategy (e.g., the impact of the strategy on another country, region, the economy; or the potential impact of resource constraints on strategy implementation). Ideally, such a process leads to the development of the National Security Strategy and derivative strategies such as the Quadrennial Defense Review/Defense Strategy Review and the National Military Strategy, among others. At all levels, the strategy formulation process should consider the same four elements: ways and means in the service of ends accompanied by a thorough risk assessment.

A.5.a.5. The Strategy Formulation Framework as a graphical representation seemingly implies that the process is straightforward, that is, that a rational, sequential, linear and deliberative approach to policy and strategy formulation exists at the core of policy development and strategy-making. However, the formulation of national security strategy is seldom a smooth and fixed process: "means" and "ends"

often may not match especially when Congress, as an example, has a substantial say in the provision of means (resources) and in policy implementation through legislation; various "ways" can interfere with, rather than complement, one another; and specific actions and outcomes may not conform to initial intentions. Additionally, the values and interests at stake in a specific situation may be in tension or even conflict with another, requiring the policy-maker and the strategist to make trade-offs among them. Comprehending the ever-shifting interaction of all of these steps and variables underscores once again why the strategy-making environment and the processes established to formulate policy and strategy mirror the complex and ambiguous international security environment they seek to deal with.

A.5.a.6. As noted earlier, the dynamic and interactive nature of the national security strategy formulation process is difficult to depict graphically so it is worthwhile to explain the framework more completely. The flanking boxes of Figure 1 represent the international and domestic environments within which the process occurs. These boxes suggest how a host of real world forces, external to the process, can influence it. The two-way arrows in the strategy formulation block show that while the framework appears sequential, every part really depends on every other part, and that strategy requires an on-going assessment of the relationships between ends, ways, and means. Finally, strategy development is not a solitary pursuit; multiple actors from both the international and domestic domains (Congress, the federal bureaucracy, interest groups, other states, regional and international organizations, and non-state actors) influence the process. U.S. policy and strategy pronouncements and changes will cause strategy responses and adjustments by these actors that, in turn, influence subsequent U.S. actions. Thus, for this process to work optimally, political leaders and strategists must continually assess and reassess the execution of a strategy. A key task in this course will be to understand and appreciate some of the most complex national security processes of the U.S. government and how the formulation and execution of policy and strategy are fraught with numerous challenges.

A.6. **STUDENT READINGS.** Student readings will be annotated as follows:

A.6.a "Student Issue"—Items received prior to the start of the academic year or distributed by the faculty during the year.

A.6.b. "Blackboard"—Copyright items provided digitally via Blackboard.

A.6.c. "Library Reserve"—Items placed on NSPS reserve in the library. Please ask the librarians for assistance if you have any difficulty in locating a suggested reading.

A.6.d. "Database"— Library provided databases: "ProQuest", "JSTOR", "Taylor and Francis", "EBSCOHOST", or others -- Resources available through accessing USAWC Library remote access. For link to the reading, see Appendix VIII and USAWC Library Staff for username and password.

A.6.e. "Online"—Open source online resources available on the Internet. All required reading internet accessible resources will have a hyperlinked web address to indicate that the material is an open source online document.

A.7. CURRICULAR RELATIONSHIPS. NSPS will complement lessons contained in the USAWC Introduction to Strategic Studies (ISS), Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) and Strategic Leadership (SL) courses. In TWS we examined the theory of strategy and its historical application and evolution, which should enable the student to better understand the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary U.S. strategies and challenges. The Strategic Leadership course laid the foundation for the NSPS course by providing the concepts and skills required of leaders within the strategic environment through an examination of responsible command, leadership, and management practices, and group decision-making dynamics.

A.7.a. NSPS builds upon the lessons contained in SL by focusing on case studies of strategic decision-making and crisis management. This foundation should enable students to more insightfully examine the contemporary (and some future) strategic challenges in the global environment, followed by an examination and evaluation of the strategy formulation process, the elements of national power and statecraft wielded by the United States, and the processes for synchronizing and integrating those instruments. NSPS will facilitate the continued study and application of key strategic concepts and theories regarding the use of force covered in Theory of War and Strategy, as well as the integration of the military instrument of national power with the other instruments to include diplomatic, informational, and economic ones.

A.7.b. Additionally, the course will continue to build upon the roles and competencies of strategic leaders introduced in the Strategic Leadership course – especially critical, creative and systems thinking, ethical reasoning, and decision-making. Moreover, NSPS will provide the conceptual tools for work in the remaining three core courses, Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC), Defense Management (DM), and the Regional Studies Program (RSP) in which students study the various systems for strategic planning, providing the military capabilities in support of the national military strategy, and planning for global and theater military operations. NSPS will also provide a venue for discussion on the subject of the “means” behind U.S. policy and strategy by examining how America resources its wars, and the relationship of U.S. economic power to military power that provides a foundation for further examination of these issues in DM.

A.8. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME II). Joint Learning Areas are integrated into the resident core curriculum. NSPS provides the student with the foundation for understanding national security policy formulation, national and military strategy, and the national and international security environments. Specific Joint Learning Areas are listed in Appendices V and X of this directive. JPME Phase II Joint Learning Areas are taken from Appendix E to Enclosure E to Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJSCI 1800.01E, current as of 29 May 2015.

B. COURSE REQUIREMENTS. In order to complete NSPS successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the two basic requirements listed below. Each requirement will be evaluated by the Faculty Instructor (FI) throughout the course.

B.1. Contribution: The essential requirement to achieve the overall objectives of NSPS is active participation in the seminar-learning environment. Through active participation, students contribute to the learning of others. Contribution includes interaction with guest speakers. Students are expected to contribute by accomplishing the required readings, research, and tasks listed in paragraph 3, Student Requirements, for each lesson or as assigned or modified by the Faculty Instructor. Active learning begins with thorough and thoughtful preparation. Contribution will comprise 30 percent of the overall NSPS grade.

B.2. Written Requirements:

B.2.a. Requirements. Each student will complete a single writing requirement in two parts. Refer to Appendix II for a detailed description of these requirements. The first part of the writing requirement will be a single page, single-spaced bulletized paper articulating and testing a strategy to implement a policy option selected from a list provided by the Faculty Instructor. The second paper will be a 6-8 page, double-spaced background paper on the same topic. The audience for both papers is a senior Department of Defense decision-maker. The goal of the first paper is to concisely encapsulate a recommended strategy for his/her decision; the goal of the second paper is to provide him/her more background information on the topic. These papers are intended to be submitted and graded together, and are meant to simulate the type of writing requirements often found within the national security policy and strategy enterprise.

B.2.b. Evaluation Standard. Written assignments will be evaluated based on content, organization, and style. The criteria for evaluating papers will be the student's demonstrated understanding of and ability to apply course concepts, to organize material logically, and to compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently through effective writing. Descriptions of the criteria for "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards," "Needs Improvement," and "Fails to Meet Standards" are found in the Communicative Arts Directive. A paper evaluated as "Needs Improvement" or "Fails to Meet Standards" will be returned to the student for rework and resubmission. The papers will be graded as a single assignment and together will comprise 70 percent of the overall NSPS grade.

C. PLANNING CALENDAR.

October-November				
Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri
<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">23</p> <p>NSPS-1: Introduction NTL: Hillison & Gellert – U.S. Trade Policy</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">24</p> <p>NSPS-2: Internal Impacts - Global Political Order NTL: Troxell – Financial Power</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">25</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">RWR</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">26</p> <p>NSPS-3: International Impacts - Global Economic Order BH Lecture: Duckenfield – Global Economic Order (0830) NTL: Troxell – China’s Economic Rise</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">27</p> <p>NSPS-4: Domestic Impacts</p>
<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">30</p> <p>NSPS-5: Decision-Making Models NTL: Berry – The Arctic BH Lecture: McDermott-Strategic Intelligence(1300)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">31</p> <p>NSPS-6: Case Study: NSC-68 & Containment</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">1</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">RWR</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">2</p> <p>NSPS-7: Presidency and NSC NTL: Ulrich – Civil-Military Relations</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">3</p> <p>NSPS-8: Role of the Military (OSD/JS)</p>
<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">6</p> <p>NSPS-9: Congress and Interest Groups NTL: Guiberson - Congress’ Role in National Security</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">7</p> <p>NSPS-10: Case Study: Vietnam Escalation (0830-1130) BH Lecture: Jones – The Vietnam Escalation (0800) NTL- Farley – The Case for Abolishing the USAF (1145)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">8</p> <p>NSPS-11: Intro to Instruments of Power</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">9</p> <p>NSPS-12: Instruments of Power in Peacetime BH Lecture: Ries-Diplomacy as an Instrument of Power (0830)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">10</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: green;">Holiday – Veterans’ Day</p>
<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">13</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">RWR</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">14</p> <p>NSPS-13: Instruments of Power in Crisis BH Lecture: Morrell-De Serio Lecture (1500)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">15</p> <p style="text-align: center; color: blue;">SRP</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">16</p> <p>NSPS-14: Instruments of Power in Conflict NTL: Zwack - Russian Strategic Culture and Worldview</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">17</p> <p>NSPS-15: Strategic Guidance and Posture NTL: Brimley – Getting the Next Defense Strategy Right</p>
<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">20</p> <p>NSPS-16: 21st Century Strategic Environment NTL: Foster - NATO’s Role as a Security Provider</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">21</p> <p>NSPS-17: 21st Century Grand Strategy Papers due BH Lecture: Brands – Stress Testing American Grand Strategy (0830)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">22</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">23</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin: 0;">24</p>

D. BLOCK I.

D.1. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND DECISION-MAKING MODELS.

No other society has asserted that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual—a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu’s *raison d’état*. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such but the method of change, especially the use of force. A Bismarck or a Disraeli would have ridiculed the proposition that foreign policy is about method rather than substance; if indeed he had understood it. No nation has ever imposed the moral demands on itself that America has. And no country has so tormented itself over the gap between its moral values, which are by definition absolute, and the imperfection inherent in the concrete situations to which they must be applied.

—Henry Kissinger
Diplomacy

NSPS is designed to broaden our strategic level conception and understanding of the U.S. position in the current global order through a survey of the U.S. national security policy and strategy development system. The first lesson in Block I examines the strategy formulation process and introduces the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework that serves as a construct for organizing our thoughts regarding policy and strategy formulation. The next two lessons examine the global political and economic orders and how they affect U.S. national security decision-making. Lesson 4 examines the domestic national security decision-making environment, exploring historical U.S. values, the idea of “U.S. purpose” and the effect these have on how the U.S. defines its interests and formulates policy and strategy. Lesson 5 advances models of national-security decision-making and lesson 6 gives us the opportunity to apply these models to the foundation and evolution of U.S. Cold War strategy as a means of synthesizing our understanding of the tensions between values and interests and the notion of “grand strategy.”

D.2. BLOCK I OUTCOMES.

D.2.a. Explain the concepts of national security, national interests, grand strategy, policy and strategy.

D.2.b. Summarize and apply the USAWC’s Strategy Formulation Framework as a model for understanding how strategy is formulated.

D.2. c. Explain the key international and domestic factors that impact the U.S. national security decision-making process.

D.2.d. Summarize and apply the various models used to explain national security decision-making.

D.2.e. Critically examine the implementation of NSC-68 and the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union that it proposed.

D.3. LESSONS.

D.3.a. LESSON 1: INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY.

COL Bob Hamilton
245-3278
Mode: Seminar

23 October 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-1-S

D.3.a.1. Introduction

D.3.a.1.a. In *Theory of War and Strategy* (TWS) we examined the nature of conflict and searched for the theories that have provided insight to, and understanding of, the history of conflict. This course takes our informed understanding of history, conflict, and strategy and examines how the U.S. national security policy and strategy processes handle strategic challenges and opportunities. We will examine the **environment** in which U.S. policy and strategy are formulated, the **actors** who play key roles in the policy and strategy formulation process, and the **instruments** that the U.S. uses to advance its national security policy and strategy objectives. We will also explore a set of models that attempt to explain how states make national security and foreign policy decisions, and we will study historical cases through the lenses of these models. Finally, we will end the course with a survey of the strategic environment and a discussion of possible U.S. grand strategies to deal successfully with this environment.

D.3.a.1.b. In this lesson, we will begin by examining the concept of national security in the context of the modern international environment and the U.S. domestic environment. From the beginning of the Cold War to the present, the meaning of national security and national interests has been debated and redefined continuously. Is national security something that can be defined and fully surveyed, or does this concept have a changing and malleable nature? Should national security objectives be limited to defending the state against other states and non-state actors, or should issues such as migration, pandemic disease, and climate change also be included in how we approach the concept of national security? How we define national security will influence how we define our national interests. Having examined the concept of national security and national interests, we will turn to the concepts of strategy and grand strategy, exploring the relationship between these two concepts as well as the relationship between strategy, grand strategy and policy.

D.3.a.1.c. Our second task in this lesson is to explore the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework (**Appendix I**) as a means of understanding the ways in which policy and strategy are formulated at the national level. A key part of this task will be to gain an understanding of the definitions of policy and strategy, and the relationship between the two. In short, whereas policy may be defined as broad guidance that articulates national interests in the context of the strategic environment, strategy is a calculation of ways and means directed towards the accomplishment of

ends, balanced against a continuous assessment of risk. If policy answers the question of “what” the U.S. seeks to do, strategy answers the question of “how” we will do it. Grand Strategy is not specifically addressed in the Strategy Formulation Framework, although its formulation may be seen as inherent in the process of defining one’s strategic vision. Grand Strategy may be defined as the use of all instruments of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve national objectives. It is important to note that although these are the definitions we use for this course, they are not universally accepted. As the readings in this course will make clear, policy, grand strategy and strategy are complex and sometimes contested concepts in both the scholarly and governmental communities.

D.3.a.1.d. Like any conceptual framework, the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework offers an abstract and simplified representation of a dynamic and complex reality. The Framework seeks to reduce complexity by concentrating attention on the basic building blocks of strategy formulation, the strategic thought process, and the depiction of the strategy formulation process as a series of discrete steps. These steps consist of the identification of an enduring national purpose; the identification of more focused national interests supporting this purpose; a strategic vision that leads to a grand strategy and policy objectives that support it; and finally, to the formulation of a specific strategy developed through the calculated application of ways and means designed to achieve a defined national objective, or end.

D.3.a.1.e. The entire process takes place within the context of a strategic environment, depicted schematically on the Framework as a series of variables derived from both the international and domestic arenas. Strategy is therefore depicted as comprehensive and holistic – dominated by conscious political purpose – hierarchical and subordinate to national command authority. However, it is also dynamic, contextual, and decisively affected by trends within the strategic environment over which policymakers may have little or no control. We will use the Strategy Formulation Framework as a tool for introducing basic concepts in strategic analysis and for encouraging critical thinking about the dynamics and demands of strategy formulation.

D.3.a.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.a.2.a. Understand the course organization and student requirements.

D.3.a.2.b. Explain the concepts of national security, national interests, grand strategy, policy, and strategy.

D.3.a.2.c. Summarize and apply the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework, to include the relationship among ends, ways and means, as well as the SAF-R test and international and domestic influences on policy and strategy formulation.

D.3.a.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.a.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.a.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.a.3.b.1. U.S. Army War College, *Department of National Security and Strategy, Directive - National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2016), 1-6 (with a focus on the “Strategy Formulation Framework,” and Appendix I, “Guidelines for Strategy”, 103-108, SKIM Appendix II, 109-15).

[Blackboard]

D.3.a.3.b.2. Sam S. Sarkesian et al, “National Interests and National Security” and “The Policy Process”, in *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics*, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2013), 1-14 and 199-209.

[Blackboard]

D.3.a.3.b.3. Tami Davis Biddle, *Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2015), 1-10 and 43- 64.

[Blackboard]

D.3.a.3.b.4. Alan G. Stolberg, “Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century,” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 13-25,
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1110.pdf>. (accessed June 12, 2017).

[Blackboard]

D.3.a.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.a.3.c.1. Alan G. Stolberg, “Making National Security Policy,” in the 21st Century” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 41-62,
<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1110.pdf> (accessed June 12, 2017).

D.3.a.3.c.2. Marybeth P. Ulrich, “American Values, Interests and Purpose: Perspectives on the Evolution of American Political and Strategic Culture,” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 3-11,
<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1110.pdf> (accessed June 12, 2017).

D.3.a.3.c.3. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-93 in JSTOR (accessed June 12, 2017).

D.3.a.3.c.4. Charles F. Hermann, "Defining National Security," in *American Defense Policy*, ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), <http://www.voxprof.com/cfh/hermann-pubs/Hermann-Defining%20National%20Security.pdf> (accessed June 12, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally)

D.3.a.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.a.4.a. What is national security? Does this concept have an enduring meaning or does the meaning adapt to environmental context?

D.3.a.4.b. How does the way in which we define national security influence how we define national interests?

D.3.a.4.c. How are the concepts of grand strategy, policy and strategy defined, and how do they relate to one another?

D.3.a.4.d. What is the purpose of the USAWC Strategy Formulation Framework? How can this framework be used to help understand the policy/strategy process?

D.3.a.4.e. Why are these concepts important to senior military and government leaders and what roles do they play in policy and strategy formulation?

D.3.b. LESSON 2: INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION- MAKING: THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER.

COL Ian Lyles
245-4099
Mode: Seminar

24 October 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-2-S

D.3.b.1. Introduction.

D.3.b.1.a. United States security policy decision-making does not happen in a vacuum: it must reflect the dynamic domestic and international environments existing at the time. The next two lessons examine the left-hand side of our Strategy Formulation Framework. Lesson 2 addresses the international political environment and actors. Lesson 3 deals with economic institutions and influences.

D.3.b.1.b. We begin Lesson 2 with a review of prominent international relations (IR) theories (realist, liberal and constructivist schools) that offer alternative explanations for the actions of states operating in the international system. Next we consider the international system and analyze the competing types of world orders, how the current order came about and whether we are in the process of moving to a new world order.

D.3.b.1.c. We will then examine the international political framework in which the U.S. and all states operate today and how international actors and institutions impact the behavior of states. External influences include such concepts and issues as balance of power, alliances, global and regional institutions, treaties and international law, as well as social factors such as religion, migration, cultural priorities and perspectives. The international panoply of non-state actors and movements, NGOs and multinational corporations also influence the actions of states.

D.3.b.1.d. The array of international factors impacting the actions of a state is dynamic and amorphous. How these features come together to influence decision-making in any given situation is unique to that situation. Yet national security decision-makers who discount or misunderstand important external factors do so at great peril to their nations. The purpose of this lesson is to raise awareness and challenge your strategic thinking with respect to the global system and actors that impact U.S. national security strategy. Understanding the “other” is crucial to this process.

D.3.b.1.e. This lesson introduces the Strategic Appraisal Tool, a flexible approach to problem solving or thinking aid, to assist you in understanding the external environment. As you will see, many states, non-state actors, international organizations, empowered individuals and NGOs compete in the international arena, all seeking to achieve their own ends in support of what they define as their interests. The Strategic Appraisal Tool is intended to help you better appreciate and understand the possible motivations of external actors and entities in order to seek opportunities to better cooperate with friends and allies and to mitigate or deter the actions of

adversaries and competitors. The Strategic Appraisal Tool is a thinking aid rather than a conceptual framework and thus will not be evaluated during comprehensive exams. However, students may make reference to it if they choose to do so.

D.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.b.2.a. Understand the major attributes of the contemporary international system and their impact on national security decision-making.

D.3.b.2.b. Understand the Strategic Appraisal Tool and its application to analysis of the external environment at the strategic level.

D.3.b.2.c. Analyze the actors, tools, and rules of international politics and explain the historical foundations of the current world order.

D.3.b.2.d. Analyze how international institutions constrain or influence U.S. national security decisions.

D.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.b.3.a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the points to consider in Paragraph 4 below.

D.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.b.3.b.1. Glenn P. Hastedt, "The Global Context," in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2014), 30-51. [Student Issue]

D.3.b.3.b.2. Joseph S. Nye and David Welch, "What is International Politics?" and "International Law and Organization," in *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 8th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2009), 1-13 and 184-194. [Student Issue]

D.3.b.3.b.3. Tyler S. Moselle, *The Concept of World Order* (Harvard Kennedy School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, June 19, 2008). [Blackboard]

D.3.b.3.b.4. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993). Read all in PROQUEST (accessed June 12, 2017). [Database]

D.3.b.3.b.5. Matt Waldman, "Strategic Empathy," New America Foundation, April 2014, accessed 25 August 2017 online at:
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4350-strategic-empathy-2/Waldman%20Strategic%20Empathy_2.3caa1c3d706143f1a8cae6a7d2ce70c7.pdf
[Online]

D.3.b.3.b.6. Ian B. Lyles and Dan Cormier, "The Strategic Appraisal Tool," (USAWC, 2017). [Blackboard]

D.3.b.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.b.3.c.1. George E. Teague, “*The International Political System*,” (The United States Naval War College, March 2002; revised, edited and updated by Nick Gvosdev in March 2010 and Hayat Alvi in June 2013), 1-20.

D.3.b.3.c.2. Eric A. Posner, “Sorry, America, the New World Order is Dead,” *Foreign Policy.com* (May 6, 2014), <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/06/sorryamericathenewworldorderisdeadrussiaukraine> (accessed July 17, 2016).

D.3.b.3.c.3. Deborah L. Hanagan, “International Order,” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II : National Security Policy and Strategy*, 5th ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012) at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1005.pdf> (accessed June 12, 2017).

D.3.b.3.c.4. G. John Ikenberry, “Varieties of Order: Balance of Power, Hegemonic, and Constitutional,” in *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 21-30.

D.3.b.3.c.5. Henry A. Kissinger, “Power Shifts,” *Survival* 52, no. 6 (December 2010-January 2011): 205-212.

D.3.b.3.c.6. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

D.3.b.3.c.7. Luisa Blanchfield. *United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and International Perspectives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 21, 2011), read Summary and 1-25.

D.3.b.3.c.8. Robert Zoellick, “The Currency of Power,” *Foreign Policy* 196 (November 2012), 67-73, 78 in PROQUEST (accessed June 12, 2017).

D.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.b.4.a. What is the structure and nature of the contemporary world order? Did it change after the end of the Cold War? Is it changing now? What type of world order do we want? How do we use power to achieve it?

D.3.b.4.b. Does world order change only through major war or can other dramatic international events change it? What is driving change in the current world order?

D.3.b.4.c. The 2015 National Security Strategy includes an international order favorable to the U.S. as one of the core national interests. To what extent is the current international system favorable to U.S. interests? What can and should the U.S. do to promote a favorable international system?

D.3.b.4.d. Can the United States advance its national interests through international organizations such as the UN and NATO, or should it rely more on unilateral actions? Why and under what circumstances should it act multilaterally or unilaterally?

D.3.b.4.e. Is the UN an outdated and ineffective mechanism for promoting or assuring security in the 21st century? Are regional organizations more useful and effective for ensuring political order, peace and security? Can they wield any power if the United States does not want them to do so?

D.3.b.4.f. What should the U.S. position be on efforts to reform the UN and other international institutions?

D.3.b.4.g. If other states, entities and actors are competing to achieve their own ends and interests in the international area, how can U.S. policymakers and strategists seek to understand those positions and the needs and values that drive them?

D.3.b.4.h. How can the Strategic Appraisal Tool aid senior leaders in understanding the external international environment at the strategic level? How might you adapt the heuristic when shifting the frame of focus from states to non-state actors or multinational institutions? How might the Strategic Appraisal Tool inform what questions you as a senior leader would ask from your intelligence, economic, political or cultural advisors?

D.3.b.4.i. Should policy-makers and strategists attempt to utilize “strategic empathy” when seeking to understand the external environment? What are the benefits of such an approach? What are the possible pitfalls or shortcomings associated with “strategic empathy?” How does empathy differ from sympathy and why is that important at the strategic level of analysis?

D.3.c. LESSON 3: INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION- MAKING: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER.

Dr. Mark Duckenfield
245-3294
Mode: Lecture/Seminar

26 October 2017
0830-1230
NSPS-3-L/S

D.3.c.1. Introduction.

D.3.c.1.a. The United States has immense economic power which translates into political influence across a broad spectrum of other policy areas. The 2015 National Security Strategy declares: “The American economy is an engine for global economic growth and a source of stability for the international system. In addition to being a key measure of power and influence in its own right, it underwrites our military strength and diplomatic influence. A strong economy, combined with a prominent U.S. presence in the global financial system, creates opportunities to advance our security.” (p. 15) This lesson examines how the international economic order and economic developments are intrinsically linked to the successful pursuit of American national security objectives.

D.3.c.1.b. The United States has the world’s largest economy, provides the world’s reserve currency, and has a privileged position in major economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Nevertheless, in recent decades, countries in the developing world have grown faster than the United States and American economic dominance relative to China, India and Brazil has slipped.

D.3.c.1.c. The economic prosperity of the United States is a central objective of both its domestic and international policies. The global economic order consists of a vast array of hundreds of international institutions through which countries coordinate, cooperate and compete with one another. The United States was a major advocate for the creation of this international economic architecture and remains a major sponsor and pillar of the multilateral economic order.

D.3.c.1.d. The international financial crisis of 2008-9 brought the international economic system to the verge of collapse. Yet while the crisis pummeled the major industrial economies, the existing international economic order proved quite robust. Not only did the system itself survive, it also continued to provide support for countries experiencing serious economic problems.

D.3.c.1.e. The benefits of globalization and increased economic exchange have not been evenly distributed and this poses potential challenges to the global political and economic status quo. The old G-7 system where countries with high per capita incomes held the balance of economic power is being supplanted by the emerging G-20 system in which high population developing countries with moderate levels of per capita wealth are beginning to rival—if not supplant—many of the more traditional centers of economic power. This is particularly the case with the recent emergence of

China as the world's largest trading nation and second-largest economy. While China, along with many other developing economies, has thrived under the existing rules of the international economic system, it remains to be seen whether it will continue to find these rules to its liking or if it will seek to revise and rewrite existing rules and re-order international institutions more to its favor.

D.3.c.1.f. For seventy years the global international economic system of governance has endured and expanded, bringing with it unprecedented prosperity and economic growth. The results have not been evenly distributed -- originally developing countries complained that international economic rules advantaged wealthier countries. More recently, as labor-intensive industries and many manufacturing jobs have shifted to the developing world, complaints have arisen in developed economies that their jobs have been "exported" and that "unfair" competition from foreigners have eroded their previously high wages and led to a rise in unemployment. Popular hostility has been directed not only at the system of international trade and money, but also at immigrants and refugees flowing into Europe and the United States.

D.3.c.1.g. Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election with the central promise to roll back globalization, restrict migration, and take a protectionist stance on international trade. In doing so, he explicitly rejected the elite consensus that dominated both American political parties since the end of the Second World War. He argued that international trade deals in particular disadvantaged American workers and undermined the US economy. As a result, long-standing US policies and relationships with key international institutions are now being re-assessed and are in a state of flux.

D.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson students should be able to:

D.3.c.2.a. Assess the rationale for the inclusion of economic interests as a part of US grand strategy.

D.3.c.2.b. Analyze the importance and consequences of America's relative economic power as they relate to the global balance of power.

D.3.c.2.c. Identify the major international economic institutions and explain their impact on the international system.

D.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.c.3.a.Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the points to consider in Paragraph 4 below.

D.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.c.3.b.1. Weede, Erich, "The Capitalist Peace and the Rise of China: Establishing Global Harmony by Economic Interdependence," *International Interactions*, Vol. 36, Issue 2, (2010), pp. 206-213. [Blackboard]

D.3.c.3.b.2. Kagan, Robert, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline," *The New Republic*, January 2012 [12 pages]
<http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/>
(accessed June 15, 2017) [Online]

D.3.c.3.b.3. Nye, Joseph, "Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2017). Available at:
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive> (accessed June 15, 2017) [Online]

D.3.c.3.b.4. Hoffmann, Stanley, "Clash of Globalizations" *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2002), pp. 104-115. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-07-01/clash-globalizations> (accessed June 15, 2017) [Online]

D.3.c.3.b.5. Donald J. Trump, "The Inaugural Address", January 20, 2017. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address> (accessed October 20, 2017) [Online]

D.3.c.3.b.6. Stewart M. Patrick, "Trump and World Order: The Return of Self-Help," *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 2017) [Blackboard]

D.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.c.3.c.1. COL Deborah Hanagan, *Bretton Woods and Economic Order* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2013).

D.3.c.3.c.2. Eric A. Posner, "Sorry, America, the New World Order is Dead," *Foreign Policy.com* (May 6, 2014),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/06/sorry_america_the_new_world_order_is_dead_russia_ukraine (accessed August 11, 2016).

D.3.c.3.c.3. Henry A. Kissinger, "Power Shifts," *Survival* 52, no. 6 (December 2010-January 2011), 205-212.

D.3.c.3.c.4. Jorge G. Castaneda, "Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 5 (September-October 2010): 109-122 in PROQUEST (accessed August 11, 2016).

D.3.c.3.c.5. Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini, "A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 2-7, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-01-31/g-zero-world> (accessed June 15, 2017).

D.3.c.3.c.6. Mark Duckenfield, "Fiscal Fetters: The Economic Imperatives of National Security in a Time of Austerity," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (Air University;

Maxwell AFB, AL 2012): <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/summer12.pdf> (accessed August 25, 2016). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally)

D.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.c.4.a. What is the relationship between the current international economic order and the economic power of the United States?

D.3.c.4.b. How does increasing globalization of economies influence international relations?

D.3.c.4.c. If American economic power erodes, will the system of international economic order and stability likewise erode?

D.3.c.4.d. Assess the rationale for the inclusion of economic interests as a part of US grand strategy.

D.3.d. LESSON 4: DOMESTIC IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING: U.S. HISTORY, VALUES AND INTERESTS.

Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt
245-3292
Mode: Seminar

27 October 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-4-S

D.3.d.1. Introduction.

D.3.d.1.a. The strategy-formulation framework begins with identification and understanding of a “national purpose”—defined as a nation’s enduring values and beliefs, and from which “national interests” can be derived. This lesson seeks not only to explore this dynamic within the United States (both historically and in the contemporary moment), but also to complicate these ideas by asking about the relationship between “values” and “interests” and by asking about how ideas about American values and interests have been debated and have evolved over time. This lesson does not, however, suggest that an articulation of values and interests is unimportant in the formulation and execution of national security policy and strategy. In fact, this lesson challenges you to consider the rhetorical, cultural, and political power of these considerations for strategic leaders. This lesson emphasizes the ways in which values and interests are held in tension and contested within the United States, especially in the period after 11 September 2001.

D.3.d.1.b. We find evidence of the values and interests that underpin American strategy in various places: we might look to the nation’s founding documents, such as the Constitution and Declaration of Independence; to speeches and statements by presidents, cabinet secretaries, and general officers; to public opinion and media representations of American values and interests; or to the formal documents issued by a particular administration, such as a national security strategy or national military strategy. But we must also recognize that none of these are self-evident sources from which we can derive a finite set of American values and interests, though there are clear patterns to the debate and the ideas that animate American policy makers and strategists.

D.3.d.1.c. Often, the animating ideas for American grand strategy (and therefore designated as core national interests) are summarized as being related to the security of the United States, its citizens, and its allies; economic prosperity; a stable international order; and the promotion of national values. But what, exactly, these ideas mean and the ways in which they should inform national security policy and strategy are always contested. Furthermore, it is clear that pursuing these goals often requires tradeoffs and prioritizing certain values over others.

D.3.d.1.d. The readings for this lesson begin with a somewhat-theoretical chapter by David Welch, which explores the problem of defining both “morality” and “national interest.” Consider his critiques carefully, and pay close attention to the way the language of morality, values, interests, and national purpose are used in the

remaining readings for the lesson as well as in contemporary discussions about US strategy and policy. In the second reading, Christopher Hemmer identifies four recurring debates in American history over the direction of grand strategic aims: Balancing unilateralism and multilateralism; the role of values and interests in U.S. foreign policy; where is the U.S. strategic perimeter; and is time on America's side. Hemmer then uses this substantive framework to explore President Obama's foreign policy. Melvyn Leffler's 2005 article explores questions about continuity and change in US Foreign Policy before and after 9/11 and makes an argument about the relationship between values, interests, and threats. Finally, we end with a speech by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to State Department employees in May 2017, which is (to date) the most comprehensive and cohesive foreign policy statement to come out of the Trump Administration.

D.3.d.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.d.2.a. Appraise the distinction made between values (morality) and interests as drivers for formulating policy and strategy.

D.3.d.2.b. Explain key historical and contemporary debates about the direction and purpose of grand strategy and foreign policy in the United States.

D.3.d.2.c. Assess the relative role and relationship between national values and national interests in crafting American strategy and policy over time.

D.3.d.2.d. Explain the contested nature of defining values and interests.

D.3.d.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.d.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.d.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.d.3.b.1. David Welch, "Morality and 'the National Interest'" in *Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases*. Ed. Andrew Valls (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 3-12. [Blackboard]

D.3.d.3.b.2. Christopher Hemmer, Selections from *American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 1-17 and 151-185. NOTE: Read Chapter 8, "Don't Do Stupid Stuff" after reading the Leffler article (R3 listed below). [Blackboard]

D.3.d.3.b.3. Melvyn P. Leffer, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 3 (June 2005): 395-413. [Blackboard]

D.3.d.3.b.4. Rex Tillerson, "Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees," 3 May 2017, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm> (accessed June 15, 2017). [Online]

D.3.d.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.d.3.c.1. Marybeth P. Ulrich, "American Values, Interests and Purpose: Perspectives on the Evolution of American Political and Strategic Culture," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, vol. II National Security Policy and Strategy, 5th ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 3-11.

D.3.d.3.c.2. Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers," in *The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 1-27.

D.3.d.3.c.3. *The Constitution of the United States*, Read Articles 1 & 2, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution> (accessed June 14, 2017).

* You will also find many other interesting links at this National Archives site.

D.3.d.3.c.4. *The Economist*, "What Would America Fight For?", May 3, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601508-nagging-doubt-eating-away-world-orderand-superpower-largely-ignoring-it-what> (accessed June 15, 2017).

D.3.d.3.c.5. Derek Chollet and Tod Lindberg, "A Moral Core for U.S. Foreign Policy," Policy Review no. 146 (Dec2007/Jan2008), <http://www.hoover.org/research/moral-core-us-foreign-policy> (accessed June 15, 2017)

D.3.d.3.c.6. Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler, "A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States," *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 4 (December 2011): 803-819.

D.3.d.3.c.7. Odd Arne Westad, "The Empire of Liberty," from *Global Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8-38.

D.3.d.3.c.8. Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2017) <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt> (accessed June 15, 2017).

D.3.d.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.d.4.a. What are the critiques that David Welch levels on the utility of using either morality (values) or national interests to craft or analyze strategy and foreign policy? How persuasive are they?

D.3.d.4.b. How have “values” and “interests” been defined in the history of American grand strategy and national security policy? To what extent have these ideas been in competition or alignment with each other?

D.3.d.4.c. To what extent can we define “enduring” national values or interests in the United States? How has the construction of national values and national interests affected US grand strategy and policy since 11 September?

D.3.d.4.d. What arguments do Leffer and Hemmer make about the policies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama? To what extent does Tillerson’s speech represent continuity or change with previous administrations?

D.3.d.4.e. How have debates about values and interests shaped American grand strategy historically? How do they appear to be shaping foreign policy and strategy in the first year of the Trump administration?

D.3.e. **LESSON 5: NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING MODELS.**

Prof George Teague
245-3141
Mode: Seminar

30 October 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-5-S

All models are wrong, but some are useful.

—George Box, Statistician

D.3.e.1. Introduction.

D.3.e.1.a. Crafting foreign and security policy at the national level is a practical undertaking. Though we still occasionally cite the hopeful phrase of Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, made in 1947, that, “politics stops at the water’s edge,” national security policymaking is most often a contested process where the competitive interplay of personalities, institutions, and priorities are critical variables. Policymaking is not a textbook exercise. It is a robust and multifaceted political process that often produces unpredictable outcomes.

D.3.e.1.b. In the American context, the policymaking process unfolds within a formalized structure, but with many informal variables in play. The process is designed to have policy and feedback flow smoothly between top and bottom, with ample time for analysis and reflection. American governance is not always conducive to rapid response to national needs or maximizing efficiency. Rather, priority is placed upon sustaining stability and continuity. Changes of direction are usually incremental, consisting of modest adjustments to the status quo.

D.3.e.1.c. However, on occasion a crisis will emerge where vital interests are perceived to be at stake, where there is an imminent threat of armed conflict, and policy makers find themselves under severe time constraints. In such cases, the national security policy painstakingly forged by various stakeholders may require reexamination and recalibration, or may even be discarded or ignored. In times of crisis, the government can ill afford hesitance or paralysis. The conduct of business will normally be driven from the top down, often at the highest level, with fewer actors involved. Such crisis decision-making is streamlined; nonetheless, the complex dynamics that affect all foreign and security policy decision-making still apply.

D.3.e.1.d. For this lesson we will use David Patrick Houghton’s *The Decision Point* as our core reading. Houghton focuses on both theoretical and case-based analyses to examine how real U.S. foreign policy decision-makers make decisions. The assigned readings will give us some perspectives through which to analyze and understand the ways in which high-level decision-making may be shaped and why it often falls short of “pure rationality,” or apparent optimal effectiveness. Houghton has refreshed and updated the classic decision-making models developed by Graham Allison in *Essence of Decision* (see recommended readings). The assigned readings and classroom discussion are designed to provide us with four comparative analytic models with

which to critically examine and understand foreign policy decision-making, and to inform their interaction and potential participation in the same.

D.3.e.1.e. As George Box implies in the quote at the beginning of this lesson, no model can fully and accurately portray the complex interplay of variables involved in any real-world national security decision-making process. Nevertheless, decision-making models of the type advanced by Houghton are useful in that they provide a simplified representation of a complex process and alert us to factors that may play important roles in shaping decisions. An understanding of the decision-making frameworks discussed in Houghton's work (and those to which you were exposed in the Strategic Leadership course) should allow us to better understand why American policymakers made the decisions they did in our upcoming case studies examining NSC-68/Containment (Lesson 6), the decision to escalate the war in Vietnam (Lesson 10), and the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 (Lesson 14).

D.3.e.2. Learning Outcomes: By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.e.2.a. Summarize the rational actor model as well as the roles of bureaucratic, sociological, and psychological factors in the policy process through understanding Houghton's four models of decision making.

D.3.e.2.b. Assess the value of Houghton's models in policy and strategy formulation and implementation.

D.3.e.2.c. Assess the differences between crisis decision-making and formal or institutionalized policy and strategy development processes.

D.3.e.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.e.3.a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the points to consider in Paragraph 4 below.

D.3.e.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.e.3.b.1. David P. Houghton, *The Decision Point* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). [Student Issue]

Read:

- (1) "Introduction," 3-18;
- (2) "Homo Bureaucraticus," 23-42;
- (3) "Homo Sociologicus," 43-61;
- (4) "Homo Psychologicus," 62-84.

D.3.e.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.e.3.c.1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

D.3.e.3.c.2. Alex Mintz, "How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 1 (February 2004): 1 in JSTOR (accessed June 13, 2017).

D.3.e.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.e.4.a. What are the most important assumptions of the Homo Economicus (or Rational Actor) Model? What are its primary advantages and disadvantages in explaining policy outcomes?

D.3.e.4.b. What are the primary differences between the Homo Bureaucraticus and Homo Economicus Models? What are the most important factors in government decision-making from the Homo Bureaucraticus Model?

D.3.e.4.c. What are the key variables affecting policy outcomes that are highlighted by the Homo Sociologicus Model?

D.3.e.4.d. How do the five basic assumptions of the Homo Psychologicus Model inform our interpretation and understanding of the other decision making models?

D.3.e.4.e. What are the key differences between crisis decision-making and formal deliberate decision-making as they relate to strategy, if any?

D.3.f. LESSON 6: CASE STUDY I: CONTAINMENT AND NSC 68.

Dr. Tami Davis Biddle
245-3282
Mode: Seminar

31 October 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-6-S

The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... The United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate... and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

—George F. Kennan
Congress and National Security

(Council Special Report No. 58. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010) 1947

D.3.f.1. Introduction.

D.3.f.1.a. This lesson examines strategy and grand strategy in the context of US national security; it uses a case study – the development and roll out of NSC 68 in 1950 – as a vehicle for understanding the US response to a pressing national security problem: the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the expansion of communist ideology. National Security Council paper # 68 was crafted by Paul Nitze, the then head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. (Nitze would go on to have a long and influential career in the realm of US national security.) Threats to US national security have surely changed since the nation rose to great power status in the mid 20th century, and the mechanisms for coping with these threats have changed as well. But there is much to be learned by the use of historical case studies. By examining decisions made in the past we can analyze decision-makers’ assessments of the external environment and threats to US interests. We can evaluate decision-makers’ assessments of the enemy (including his likely behavior in response to US actions). And we can examine the way that decision-makers’ sought to create a calculated relationship between ends, ways, and means, and used their own conceptions of the ‘SAF’ criteria (suitable, acceptable, and feasible) in the planning process. A willingness to ask probing questions about the past can hone and sharpen our ability to ask targeted and incisive questions about the present. In addition, it can heighten our present-day situational awareness and build the quality of empathy that is terribly important for strategic thinkers.

D.3.f.1.b. A preponderance of US government resources for US national security is allocated to the Pentagon and the vast architecture of the U.S. military. (This is, in part, a direct result of NSC 68.) This makes it imperative that senior military officers become fully educated not only about the complex tasks of their own profession, but also about the ways in which US decision-makers (including senior political leaders and interagency leaders) think about US national security and the most central questions of grand strategy. These involve – above all – making hard choices about

how to use limited resources to best protect and advance American interests in the world.

D.3.f.1.c. In this case study we will examine the environment of the late 1940s, and the crafting of what became the principal strategy for the waging of the Cold War, articulated in NSC 68. We will read an essay examining the birth of NSC 68 (the conditions that shaped it, and the way it came to life), and we will read and analyze the language of NSC 68 itself. Declassified in 1975, the key themes in the document had largely made their way into the press in the 1950s. We will assess NSC 68 as an example of strategy formulation, and we will evaluate its merits and its flaws. For this lesson to succeed, you must pay very close attention to the language and structure of the document. It reveals the atmosphere of the day, and Nitze's ability to articulate and promote a strategic approach to the problem of the Soviet Union.

D.3.f.1.d. Nitze was working in the highly-charged environment of 1949-1950, when a series of crises had prompted a review of American policy towards its former World War II ally, the Soviet Union. Despite the unconditional surrender of Germany, the post-WWII political settlement in Europe had been difficult due to emerging differences between the Soviet Union and its wartime allies. The Czech coup and the Berlin Blockade in 1948 were followed in 1949 by the fall of China to Mao's communist forces, and the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb. These events directly threatened U.S. global interests, and strained the relationship between democratic states relying on free market systems and communist states relying on state-controlled economies.

D.3.f.1.e. Between 1945 and 1950, U.S. policymakers had faced an era of tremendous transition and turmoil. They not only had to adjust American policy to fit the nation's new role in the world (and the new threats it faced), but they had to build the organizations and bureaucratic institutions suited to protecting and advancing the nation's interests. Although the United States had momentarily enjoyed an atomic monopoly, conventional Soviet land power cast a long shadow over the Eurasian continent. But the heart of the U.S.-Soviet conflict was over political ideology: it was not clear how communism and liberal democracy would co-exist, especially since both tended toward universalism. Nitze, building on the work of Soviet expert George Kennan, called for the "containment" of Soviet influence around the world. But Nitze went further than Kennan by calling for an assertive version of containment that would rest heavily upon an expanded U.S. military, well-armed with both conventional and atomic weapons.

D.3.f.1.f. While President Truman initially was hesitant to go forward with the resource commitment that NSC 68 implied, the Korean War (which began in June 1950) changed the environment. It opened the way for the resourcing and implementation of much of what Nitze had recommended. The result was, in many respects, a kind of militarization of containment. The original author of containment, George Kennan, was uneasy about the new trajectory as he had initially conceived the approach as one that would rely principally on political and economic tools.

D.3.f.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.f.2.a. Summarize the circumstances in which NSC 68 was created.

D.3.f.2.b. Assess how and why NSC 68 was crafted as a national strategy to address the emergent Soviet threat.

D.3.f.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.f.3.a. Tasks. None

D.3.f.3.b. Required Readings.

D.3.f.3.b.1. Ernest May's "Introduction," in May ed. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 1-17. [Blackboard]

D.3.f.3.b.2. The Executive Secretary, "NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council," *Naval War College Review* 27, no. 6 (May-June 1975): 51-108, <http://www.usnwc.edu/NavalWarCollegeReviewArchives/1970s/1975%20May-June.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

D.3.f.3.c. Suggested Readings.

D.3.f.3.c.1. George Kennan, "The Long Telegram," (February 22, 1946): Introduction through Part 2, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm> (accessed June 13, 2017).

D.3.f.3.c.2. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25-126.

D.3.f.3.c.3. John Lewis Gaddis, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security* 4, No. 4. (Spring 1980), 164-76.

D.3.f.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.f.4.a. Do you think that the rapid sequence of disturbing events (from the U.S. perspective) in 1948 and 1949 contributed to the tone and language found in NSC 68? Do sequences of events shape the outlook of policymakers more forcefully than single events do?

D.3.f.4.b. Nitze describes the fundamental question of national security as follows: "How do we get from where we are to where we want to be without being struck by disaster along the way?" At the time of NSC 68, he clearly saw the Soviet political, economic, and military structures aimed at world domination. What shaped his

interpretation? What evidence does he assert to support his contention? Nitze also believed that the Soviet Union posed a direct threat to the very existence of the United States as a free and democratic nation. Why did he believe this?

D.3.f.4.c. Was containment an end or a way? In what respects was containment an objective itself, and in what way was it an instrument to shape pursuit of other, specific ends?

D.3.f.4.d. Did NSC 68 find an appropriate relationship between ends, ways, and means? How much risk did Nitze and his colleagues assume?

D.3.f.4.e. While it highlighted the importance of political and economic tools, NSC 68 also gave high priority to military elements of power for coping with the Soviet threat. Do you feel Nitze got the balance right? What leverage did Nitze feel economic, political, and military elements would bring to the table? How did he envision U.S. policymakers using that leverage?

D.3.f.4.f. Critics of NSC 68, including the author of the original containment policy, George Kennan, believed that Nitze's emphasis on military means and ways was unnecessary and even unhelpful. Do you agree or disagree, based on what you know about the era, and about what unfolded during the remainder of the Cold War?

E. BLOCK II.

E.1. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS.

The various agencies that propose and execute policy interact to choose among policy alternatives that the executive branch will implement or, if necessary, submit to the legislative branch for its approval. Generally, administrations have sought to involve Congress in foreign policy matters as little as possible. Presidents and their advisers often come to think of foreign and security policy as their own preserves, matters that they should be allowed to handle with minimum interference, especially when sensitive or classified information is involved. At times in U.S. history, Congress acceded to this attitude, but in recent decades that has clearly been less the case. When presidents ignore Congress, fail to consult it adequately (as defined by Congress), or engage in foreign policy misdeeds or misguided policies, the battle is joined.

—Donald M. Snow/Eugene Brown
Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom, 147-148

This block focuses on the key actors in the U.S. national security enterprise. These include the President, the National Security Advisor and members of the National Security Council, and the U.S. Congress. We also dedicate a lesson in this block to the role of the military in the policy process, focusing on the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Finally, we examine the nature of policy decision-making and use a case study on the escalation of the Vietnam War to synthesize the lessons from this block of instruction.

E.2. OBJECTIVES.

E.2.a. Explain the role of the executive and legislative branches in the national security decision-making process.

E.2.b. Explain the impact of Presidential leadership style on the national security decision-making process.

E.2.c. Explain the role of interest groups in influencing the national security decision-making process.

E.2.d. Explain the role of the uniformed military and the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense in the national security decision-making process.

E.2.e. Appraise the decision to escalate U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War in 1965.

E.3. LESSONS.

E.3.a. LESSON 7: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM I: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE NSC.

Dr. Frank L. Jones
245-3126
Mode: Seminar

2 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-7-S

E.3.a.1. Introduction.

E.3.a.1.a. In this lesson, we will examine the role of the President, the assistant to the President for national security affairs (APNSA or more commonly known as the national security advisor), and the National Security Council in the policymaking process. The U.S. Constitution enumerates six formal roles and powers for the President that grant significant, but not complete authority in foreign affairs. Further, given the vastness of the federal bureaucracy, a president cannot administer these organizations directly, but can call upon their expertise and resources to assist in the formulation and implementation of policy.

E.3.a.1.b. This expertise resides in the president's personal staff (the National Security Council staff) under the direction of the national security advisor, but also with the National Security Council (NSC) and the departments and agencies that the members of the Council represent. By law, the function of the NSC is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." The Council's statutory membership consists of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor.

E.3.a.1.c. Another aspect of this lesson is to examine the role of the assistant to the President for national security affairs (NSA). The national security advisor is not a statutory member of the NSC, but traditionally is responsible for determining the policy agenda in consultation with the other regular members of the NSC, ensuring necessary papers are prepared, recording NSC deliberations, and disseminating presidential decisions. However, the authorities and responsibilities of the NSA, as well as other members of the President's national security team, have often varied significantly from one administration to another. Thus, the functions that the advisor performs (usually categorized in the scholarly literature as administrator, coordinator, counselor, or agent) are ultimately the President's decision.

E.3.a.1.d. We begin this lesson by exploring the role of the President and the National Security Council in the national security policymaking process and in particular, the national security system structure the Trump administration has established. A

second step is to examine more specifically the role of the national security advisor in the policymaking and decision-making processes. Lastly, we use a historical vignette, the 2006 Iraq strategy review, to study how the national security advisor can influence the decision-making process and equally important, how the relationship between the advisor and the President is fundamental to agenda setting and the examination of policy options.

E.3.a.2. Learning Outcomes. At the end of the lesson, the student should be able to:

E.3.a.2.a. Summarize the roles of the various participants in the national security policymaking process, especially the President, the national security advisor and the NSC.

E.3.a.2.b. Explain how presidential managerial style and personality influence the formulation and implementation of national security policy, and evaluate how presidents use a variety of skills to accomplish their national security policy objectives successfully.

E.3.a.2.c. Explain the national security policymaking system's effectiveness in helping the President formulate and implement national security policy by assessing the influence that the national security advisor and the National Security Council have in managing the system for this purpose.

E.3.a.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.a.3.a. Tasks.

E.3.a.3.a.1. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

E.3.a.3.a.2. Be prepared to discuss the difficulties inherent in a policymaking process that is complex, fragmented, and reliant on a variety of skills, expertise, agendas and influences.

E.3.a.3.b. Required Readings.

E.3.a.3.b.1. Glenn P. Hastedt, "Presidency," in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*, 10th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, pp. 175-197. [Blackboard]

E.3.a.3.b.2. President Donald J. Trump, National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, "Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees," Washington, DC: The White House, April 4, 2017. <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/06/2017-07064/organization-of-the-national-security-council-the-homeland-security-council-and-subcommittees> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

E.3.a.3.b.3. I.M. Destler, "How National Security Advisers See Their Role," in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: insights and Evidence*, ed. James M. McCormick, 6th ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012, pp. 209-221.

[Blackboard]

E.3.a.3.b.4. Colin Dueck, "The Role of the National Security Advisor and the 2006 Iraq Strategy Review," *Orbis* 58, no. 1(Winter 2014): 15-38
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438713000768> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

E.3.a.3.c. Suggested Readings.

E.3.a.3.c.1. Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief*. New York: G. Braziller, 1960.

E.3.a.3.c.2. Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.

E.3.a.3.c.3. Gary Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Iraq*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

E.3.a.3.c.4. Elizabeth N. Saunders, *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.

E.3.a.3.c.5. Joseph G. Dawson, *Commanders-in-Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

E.3.a.3.c.6. Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics*, 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013.

E.3.a.3.c.7. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Decision-making in the White House: The Olive Branch or The Arrows*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

E.3.a.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.a.4.a. What events prompted the creation of the National Security Council? How has this advisory system changed since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947? Why has the advisory system changed?

E.3.a.4.b. How do presidential leadership style and presidential personality influence the policymaking process? How do these two factors affect the president's advisory system for national security decision-making?

E.3.a.4.c. President Dwight Eisenhower once remarked, "Organization cannot of course make a successful leader out of dunce, any more than it should make a

decision for its chief. But it is effective in minimizing the chances of failure and insuring that the right hand does, indeed, know what the left hand is doing.” In your estimation, how much credit should be given to a well-organized advisory system in helping the President make prudent decisions on national security issues?

E.3.a.4.d. What are the domestic and international ramifications when the President uses the various strategies Hastedt mentions to sidestep the limitations that the U.S. Constitution places on his office?

E.3.a.4.e. Are there fundamental weaknesses with relying on the War Powers Act to prevent the President from acting unilaterally on national security issues, especially the deployment of U.S. forces?

E.3.b. LESSON 8: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING.

Dr. Marybeth Ulrich
245-3272
Mode: Seminar

3 November, 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-8-S

E.3.b.1. Introduction.

E.3.b.1.a. Policymaking is different than strategy making. Policy is a political goal, regardless of the sphere of politics or any organizational setting. It is what outcome is to be achieved. Policy in the national security arena, we might say, is Policy with a capital “P.” Policy as used by executives and managers in every organization is policy with a small “p.” In either case, policy is a control or forcing mechanism—a form of organizational power—that either constrains or advances behaviors towards a political end. Strategy, on the other hand, is how the policy is to be achieved. In this lesson, we look at the policymaking process from the perspective of the military involvement in that Policy process, Policy with a capital “P.”

E.3.b.1.b. Understanding the players and roles acting in the national security decision-making process opens up a different world than what you may have experienced in the operational and tactical realms. The stage is usually Washington, D.C. and not the combatant command headquarters or the battlefield. The players are predominately civilians—at the senior levels, the civilians are either elected, appointed by elected civilians, or have been appointed by civilians who themselves have been appointed by elected civilians.

E.3.b.1.c. However, senior military leaders fill advisory roles that are critical to this process. In fact, the status of the military as a profession is intrinsically linked to the expertise that military actors uniquely hold. Society depends on the cultivation and sharing of this expertise to maintain the nation’s defense. Consequently, a thorough understanding of civil-military relations at the strategic level is a vital competency for senior military leaders. This lesson will provide an overview of civil-military relations competencies that are relevant for national security professionals actively participating in the national security decision making and policy formulation process.

E.3.b.1.d. The lesson will also lay out the roles that various defense-related actors play in the national security decision-making space. The specific organizational context of the Department of Defense will be studied as a means of understanding the interface of military actors throughout the national security system.

E.3.b.1.e. Finally, we will discuss the current state of US civil-military relations. We will consider how the military’s increasingly distant relationship with society may be affecting the national security decision making and policy process, particularly with regard to use of force and the conduct of long wars. This lesson continues our

exploration of the instruments of power in relation to the development of policy where, in our system, military leaders advise and civilian leaders decide.

E.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.b.2.a. Summarize the main civil-military relations competencies expected of senior leaders.

E.3.b.2.b. Summarize the key points of cooperation and tension in the civil-military policy interface.

E.3.b.2.c. Assess how the military participates in the interagency process and its interactions with other key stakeholders in the national security policy process.

E.3.b.2.d. Explain the key military actors in the national security policy process and their roles.

E.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.b.3.a. Tasks. None.

E.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.

E.3.b.3.b.1. Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Frameworks," in *Civil-Military Relations: Theory and Practice*, (Westview Press, forthcoming) (approx. 20 pages) [Blackboard]

E.3.b.3.b.2. Colin Gray, "Politics and War" in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58-64. [Blackboard]

E.3.b.3.b.3. Amos A. Jordan et al., "The Role of the Military in the Policy Process," in *American National Security*, 6th ed., ed. Amos A. Jordan et al. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 170-89. [Blackboard]

E.3.b.3.b.4. Stephen M. Saideman, "More than Advice? The Joint Staff and American Foreign Policy," in *Inside Defense, Understanding the U.S. Military in the 21st Century*, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 31- 39. [Blackboard]

E.3.b.3.b.5. James Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic* (January 2015), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/> (accessed June 30, 2017). [Online]

E.3.b.3.c. Suggested Readings.

E.3.b.3.c.1. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Role of the Chairman* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/jcspart1.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2017). Scan pages 3-38. Note: A brief history of the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from World War II to the Chairmanship of John Shalishkashvili, containing a large number of photos of the chairmen and the “tank” and 9-10 pages of text.

E.3.b.3.c.2. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs,” in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 374-87.

E.3.b.3.c.3. Marybeth P. Ulrich, “Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).

E.3.b.3.c.4. Suzanne Nielsen and Don M. Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

E.3.b.3.c.5. Frank L. Jones, “U.S. Defense Policymaking: A 21st-Century Perspective,” in *Handbook of Defense Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest (New York, NY: Routledge 2008).

E.3.b.3.c.6. Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism To Jointness,” *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 91-111 in JSTOR (accessed June 13, 2017).

E.3.b.3.c.7. Christopher Paul, “The U.S. Military Intervention Decision-Making Process: Who Participates, and How,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 32, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 19-43.

E.3.b.3.c.8. Wade Markel, “The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS’s Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises,” *Parameters* 38, no.1 (Spring 2008): 16-29 PROQUEST (accessed June 13, 2017).

E.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.b.4.a. What are the sources of the tension inherent in the civil-military relationship at the strategic level?

E.3.b.4.b. How do the roles, competencies, and responsibilities of the civilian and political leadership differ?

E.3.b.4.c. What are the normative principles associated with giving military advice to civilian policymakers?

E.3.b.4.d. How would you characterize and describe the relationships between OSD, the Joint Staff, the Interagency, and the Combatant Commands? How does each interact with the other, with the President, the interagency process, and Congress? What is the role of each in policy development, advice, and policy implementation?

E.3.b.4.e. What are the key issues and challenges in US civil-military relations today? What are the implications for national security policy outcomes?

E.3.c. LESSON 9: THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM II: CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS.

Dr. Frank L. Jones
245-3126
Mode: Seminar

6 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-9-S

E.3.c.1. Introduction.

E.3.c.1.a. The framers of the U.S. Constitution designed a government based on a system of shared and separate powers across the institutions they created. Their grants of power over foreign policy to two separate branches, the executive and the legislative, led the political scientist Edward S. Corwin, in his book *The President, Office and Powers*, to describe the result as an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”

E.3.c.1.b. Consequently, the process for the making of foreign and defense policies (that is, national security policy) requires both coordination and cooperation to achieve anything of real significance in national security affairs. It behooves national security professionals therefore, to understand how the aforementioned unique institutional arrangement influences the formulation and execution of these policies. In essence, senior military leaders and civilian officials, as participants in the U.S. political system, soon discover that they are accountable to two masters for policymaking and implementation: the President and the Congress. In this lesson, we will examine the interaction between the Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy and defense issues.

E.3.c.1.c. In doing so, we will explore how formal powers contribute to and limit the influence wielded by the Congress (and the President as well) in any specific policymaking scenario. Presidents draw upon their constitutional authority to carry out their roles as commander-in-chief and chief administrator of the federal bureaucracy. The president’s effectiveness depends largely on “strategic competence,” that is, the appropriate mastery of policy substance, process, and promotion. Gaining these competencies enables the president to exploit the institutional competencies of the executive branch. Congress, in turn, has countervailing powers to shape the development and implementation phases of policymaking. Further, the informal powers of each branch, if astutely employed, can significantly enhance the influence of either institution, a point worth weighing. To maximize the likelihood of successful policy development, the Congress must participate in the process in ways that leverage its unique institutional competencies.

E.3.c.1.d. Additionally, we will examine how various interest groups influence national security policymaking, especially with respect to the Congress. Experts estimate that there are more than 10,000 interest groups attempting to influence U.S. government policy, and a substantial number of them focus on national security issues such as arms control, military procurement, trade and diplomatic relations. As an example, the role

of policy institutes or think tanks, often categorized as public-interest groups, has evolved over time, becoming increasingly relevant during the Cold War era and even important today. It is important not to underestimate the degree of influence that these actors have in the national security policymaking process and how they have become increasingly integrated into that process.

E.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.c.2.a. Explain how the constitutional powers of the Congress affect U.S. foreign policymaking, and appraise the political dynamic that exists between the Congress and the president in this policy area.

E.3.c.2.b. Identify the role that interest groups have in shaping national security policy; describe how these actors are organized, and with whom they work at the national level to achieve their aims.

E.3.c.2.c. Analyze how the Senate and House Armed Services Committees influence U.S. national defense through oversight, the defense budget and the development of policy initiatives.

E.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.c.3.a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

E.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.

E.3.c.3.b.1. Glenn P. Hastedt, "Society" and "Congress," in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future*, 10th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, pp. 122-129, 143-171. [Blackboard]

E.3.c.3.b.2. Pat Towell, "Congress and Defense," in *Congress and the Politics of National Security*, David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 71-99. [Blackboard]

E.3.c.3.b.3. Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood, "The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction," Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Case Study 3, *National Defense University Press*, 2010, pp. 1-12. [Blackboard]

E.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.

E.3.c.3.c.1. Kay King, *Congress and National Security*. Council Special Report No. 58. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010.

E.3.c.3.c.2. Walter J. Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 7th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.

E.3.c.3.c.3. Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott, "Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Innovators: Mapping Entrepreneurs and Their Strategies," *Social Science Journal*, Vol. 47, no. 2 (Jun 2010), pp. 418-438.

E.3.c.3.c.4. Lee H. Hamilton, *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002.

E.3.c.3.c.5. James G. McGann, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, December 16, 2002.

E.3.c.3.c.6. Rebecca K. C. Hersman, *Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Chapter 2, "Individual Power and Issue Leaders," pp. 10-33, and Chapter 3, "Institutional Overlap and Issue Clusters," pp. 34-52.

E.3.c.3.c.7. Norman A. Swazo, "The Duty of Congress to Check the President's Prerogative in National Security Policy," *International Journal on World Peace*, Vol. 21, no. 4 (Dec. 2004), pp. 21-62.

E.3.c.3.c.8. James M. Lindsay, "Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, no. 3 (Sep 2003), pp. 530-546.

E.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.c.4.a. How do interest groups influence foreign policy formulation and implementation?

E.3.c.4.b. How does the Congress employ its constitutional powers to participate in the foreign policymaking process?

E.3.c.4.c. What policy initiatives can the Armed Services Committees undertake and what sources of information (internal and external) can they use to carry out their constitutional responsibilities effectively?

E.3.c.4.d. How can members of Congress shape U.S. national security policy through the institution's powers and the willingness to act as policy entrepreneurs?

E.3.c.4.e. What impact might political party or region (the congressional district or state the member represents) have on the way members of Congress vote on national security and foreign policy issues?

E.3.c.4.f. Based on your reading and current news, have committee chairs or other senior legislators lost power in shaping the legislative agenda in national security, or is it still possible for them to act on a bipartisan basis, as described in the Nunn-Lugar

case study? What factors besides leadership may help or hinder such efforts to pass legislation in that support U.S. national interests?

E.3.d. LESSON 10: CASE STUDY II: U.S. ESCALATION IN VIETNAM.

COL Bob Hamilton
245-3278
Mode: Lecture/Seminar

7 November 2017
0800-1130
NSPS-10-L/S

You have a row of dominoes set up; you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is that it will go over very quickly.

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
speaking at a press conference on April 7, 1954.

I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the president who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.

—President Lyndon Johnson,
at a White House meeting on November 24, 1963
responding to U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. telling him that Vietnam
“would go under any day if we don’t do something.”

We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.

—President Lyndon Johnson,
in a speech at Akron University on October 21, 1964,
two weeks before the presidential election.

We do this [escalating U.S. military involvement in Vietnam] in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely born this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties. And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

—President Lyndon Johnson,
speaking to the nation on April 7, 1965 explaining
his decision to send U.S. combat troops to Vietnam.

E.3.d.1. Introduction.

E.3.d.1.a. By the summer of 1965, the worsening situation in South Vietnam resulted in a concerted attempt by the Johnson Administration to assess the situation and develop a strategy to deal with it. Neither the increase in U.S. troop levels from 16,000 in August 1964, to some 71,000 less than a year later, nor the commencement of a bombing campaign against North Vietnam appeared to have any real effect. Instead, instability in the South Vietnamese government, the rapid deterioration of the South Vietnamese military, and significant and sustained Viet Cong territorial gains made it

clear that unless something changed, the prospect of a communist victory in Vietnam was a distinct possibility.

E.3.d.1.b. In June and July of 1965, a series of high-level meetings in Washington and Saigon resulted in a decision to escalate U.S. involvement in the conflict – a decision that is one of the most thoroughly analyzed foreign policy events in American history. In this lesson, we too will analyze this decision through an exercise designed to place each student in the role of one of its key participants. Your task will be to familiarize yourself with the historical context of the situation through the assigned readings and background materials, and – as a group – come up with a recommendation to the President. Inherent in this task are requirements to analyze U.S. policy objectives, consider the ways and means available to the U.S., and develop a strategy, the ends of which serve the policy objectives you inferred from the exercise material.

E.3.d.1.c. As the background reading and the exercise material – much of which consists of declassified documents used in the actual decision-making process – make clear, U.S. officials struggling with this question had to balance a number of competing and sometimes contradictory imperatives. Among these were preventing communist domination of Southeast Asia; establishing a stable, self-sustaining, non-communist government in South Vietnam; demonstrating a U.S. capability to counter wars of national liberation and sustaining the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner, especially among key allies in the region; avoiding a war with China in Asia; deterring the Soviet Union from using the U.S. engagement in Asia as an opportunity to destabilize Europe; and sustaining public support for the U.S. war effort.

E.3.d.1.d. This lesson begins with a lecture in Bliss Hall that provides an overview of the strategic situation in Vietnam in 1965. Students will then return to seminar rooms and conduct an experiential learning event that puts them in the roles of key decision-makers in the Johnson Administration as they grappled with the problem of Vietnam in the summer of 1965. The objective of this learning event is for the group to come up with a strategy to deal with the situation in Vietnam and brief that plan to the FI, playing the role of President Johnson.

E.3.d.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.d.2.a. Evaluate how decision-makers defined and articulated the appropriate “ends” for American strategy in Vietnam. Assess the “ways and means” that the United States used to achieve these ends.

E.3.d.2.b. Analyze how U.S. history and culture shaped the decision to escalate American involvement in Vietnam.

E.3.d.2.c. Explain the roles that organizational behavior, group dynamics and the individual characteristics of decision-makers played in shaping the outcome in the debate over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

E.3.d.2.d. Explain the roles played by internal/domestic and external/international factors in shaping the outcome in the debate over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

E.3.d.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.d.3.a. Tasks. Assume the role (assigned by your Faculty Instructor) of one of the participants in the decision over whether to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

E.3.d.3.b. Required Readings.

E.3.d.3.b.1. David P. Houghton, "An Agonizing Decision: Escalating the Vietnam War," in *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Oxford University Press 2013), 149-63. [Student Issue]

E.3.d.3.b.2. Gary R. Hess, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the Vietnam Crisis: 'America Keeps her word,'" in *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 76-106. [Student Issue]

E.3.d.3.b.3. 1965: The Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War: "Background Information for the Exercise", Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1-7. [Blackboard]

E.3.d.3.b.4. Escalating the War in Vietnam: A Simulation of the July 1965 Deliberations, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 3-26. [Blackboard]

E.3.d.3.b.5. Biographies of Participants: read only the biography for the official whose role you have been designated to play for the exercise. [Blackboard]

E.3.d.3.c. Suggested Readings.

E.3.d.3.c.1. George McTurnan Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1986).

E.3.d.3.c.2. Frederik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

E.3.d.3.c.3. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*. (New York: HarperCollins 1997); Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect*. (New York: Times Books, 1995).

E.3.d.3.c.4. Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect*. (New York: Times Books), 1995.

E.3.d.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.d.4.a. What other options were available to U.S. policymakers in July 1965 and why weren't these selected?

E.3.d.4.b. Was the decision to escalate fated to end in defeat or did decisions taken subsequently doom what might have otherwise been a successful strategy?

E.3.d.4.c. Was there conflict between the civilian and military members of the group concerning issues of "military expertise"? Did (or might) the members of the JCS have difficulty giving military advice to the president that might conflict with the assessment of their boss (the SecDef)?

E.3.d.4.d. Were there other officials or organizations (civilian or military) that should have been represented in this decision?

E.3.d.4.e. What insights do Houghton's three models of governmental decision-making (Homo Bureaucraticus, Homo Sociologicus, Homo Psychologicus) provide in analyzing the decision to escalate the Vietnam War?

F. BLOCK III.

F.1. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.

We will direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network. Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.

President George W. Bush
Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2001

In this block we will explore the fundamental nature, uses, and limitations of the instruments of U.S. national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). We will develop an appreciation of the instruments of power and examine how they complement, and at times, contradict one another. We will then examine how the instruments of power are used in periods of peace, crisis and war to support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

F.2. OBJECTIVES.

F.2.a. Assess the instruments of national power as “means” of promoting and protecting national interests.

F.2.b. Explain how the instruments of power are used in circumstances of peace, crisis and war.

F.2.c. Assess the U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003.

F.3. LESSONS.

F.3.a. LESSON 11: INTRODUCTION TO THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER.

COL Dan Cormier
245-3209
Mode: Seminar

8 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-11-S

F.3.a.1. Introduction.

F.3.a.1.a. In this lesson, we will examine the concept of instruments of power. Power has many definitions in international relations. The word is derived from the French *pouvoir* (to be able) and implies a capacity to affect the environment. Its application ranges from forcing others to comply with a desired goal to hidden influence¹. For example, it can be a resource to influence the behavior of others through the application of active pressure, such as through coercion. It may also be a referent factor that inspires cooperation. This last aspect can include mutually beneficial international agreements, adherence to identity norms, such as through patriotism, and concepts of international legitimacy, human rights or public opinion. Joseph Nye's concept of soft power fits into this classification. It adds "influence" to traditional notions of power, elevating the ability to attract or persuade others to an equal footing with the uses of hard power. Alvin Toffler argues that power can manifest in terms of violence, wealth and knowledge. Violence or "low-quality power" includes coercion or punishment. It is extremely inflexible and leads to resistance. Wealth is a "medium-quality" tool of power that is more flexible because it can be used in a positive way, such as through rewards, or negatively, with efforts like sanctions. The "highest quality" power that is also the most flexible is through the use of knowledge. Information and Technology offers new ways to incentivize behavior or to punish it.

F.3.a.1.b. This broader outlook of power also accounts for several other aspects. It can include structural factors, such as the efficiency of a nation's social and political organizations or its industrial capacity. It can add an assessment of the nation itself, its people, their abilities, discipline, initiative, beliefs, and resilience. Demographic factors, such as a youth bulge, can help inform our understanding of power. A nation's geography shapes its culture, outlooks, economic advantages and geostrategic positioning. Additionally, national power should be considered in its relative sense, comparing the various features to other states. This could include assessing the environment from a collective outlook, as coalitions, international agreements and global norms can amplify a state's power and influence. They can also constrain a state that adheres to them. A global outlook also shifts views of power from a nation-centric outlook to include multi-centric and transnational factors. Finally, power is not a constant. It exists within a temporal environment. This can include seeing foreign

¹ See R. Craig Nation, "National Power," in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. I: Theory of War and Strategy (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 147-158.

affairs as having an iterative and bargaining character or accepting the persistent character of global challenges.² A nation's power includes how all of these factors relate to one another and to other nations.

F.3.a.1.c. Conceiving of the nation's instruments of power within this broad spectrum allows for critical and creative applications. It helps to avoid simply repeating past techniques or applying well-established functions. This could include escaping the tendency to associate the tools of power with particular government agencies, such as seeing diplomacy as the sole purview of the State Department. It may also demand departing from bureaucratic approaches that seek efficiency to the detriment of adaptability. A more comprehensive appreciation of the instruments of power, as well as its relative advantages and disadvantages, should encourage the search for novel ways to approach national dilemmas.

F.3.a.1.d. Students have seen multiple examples of the connections between the means of power and their relationship to international relations. For example, in the Theory of War and Strategy Course there were lessons on the various domains of power. They provided a theoretic basis for thinking about how air, land and sea power affect international relations, as well as the different theories of how they may be used to achieve policy goals. The idea that there are instruments of power provides a way to clarify the various tools of statecraft.

F.3.a.1.e. Several conceptual frameworks seek to assist in understanding these tools. The readings for this lesson provide a broad overview of them. The Department of Defense, through its Joint Doctrine, organizes the instruments of power into four broad categories: Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME). It is important to note that this conceptual structure is not universally recognized. Others propose a broader framework, such as adding law enforcement, intelligence and financial means (DIME-FIL), or avoiding the barriers created by categorizations altogether. They all seek to provide "a way" to conceive of the means of national power. They also stress their dynamic use. For example, joint doctrine emphasizes the need to integrate all of the tools, as well as through creative ways, to achieve objectives. It points out that their use can diverge in purpose, scale, risk or intensity, as well as across the range of possible operations or within different time horizons. The articles by Azhar Ahmad, "Concepts of National Power," and David Jablonsky, "National Power," reinforce this outlook, offering comprehensive arguments for how to think about national power. These readings serve as a starting point for class dialogue.

F.3.a.1.f. Seminar discussion will focus on identifying and analyzing the broad factors that encompass a nation's instruments of power. A detailed exploration of the readings seeks to establish a baseline of how to think about U.S. power and its application in foreign policy. This study also allows for students to assess how worldviews relate to the uses of power. By examining the instruments of power in this

² Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 1-10.

holistic fashion, the lesson avoids approaching the subject through the conceptual walls that divide national power into the tools of departments or as distinct methods. Instead, it intends to provide a broader understanding of how the means of policy actually function, such as within a complex strategic environment, across a range of international relations theories and inside different time horizons³. This approach illuminates the connections between different policies, national interests and the nation's purpose. The lesson will establish a foundation for the remaining lessons within this block of study.

F.3.a.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

F.3.a.2.a. Assess the nation's instruments of power as conceptual tools to achieve objectives.

F.3.a.2.b. Analyze the forms, potential uses, and limitations of the different instruments of national power in the 21st Century strategic environment.

F.3.a.2.c. Assess different ways to conceive of the purpose and uses of national power.

F.3.a.3. Student Requirements.

F.3.a.3.a. Tasks.

F.3.a.3.a.1. Complete the required readings.

F.3.a.3.a.2. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

F.3.a.3.b. Required Readings.

F.3.a.3.b.1. "Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations," in *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Joint Chief of Staff, March 25, 2013), I-11 to I-15, http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed June 13, 2017). [Online]

F.3.a.3.b.2. Azhar Ahmad, "Concepts of National Power," *Strategic Studies*, vol. 32, iss. 2-3 (September, 2012), 83-101. ProQuest (accessed July 12, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Database]

F.3.a.3.b.3. David Jablonsky, "National Power," *Parameters*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring, 1997), 34-54. ProQuest (accessed July 12, 2017) [Database]

F.3.a.3.b.4. David J. Lonsdale, "Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Fifth Dimension," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 22:2-3 (January, 2008): 137-157.

³ See JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, I-11 to I-15.

F.3.a.3.c. Suggested Readings.

F.3.a.3.c.1. Glenn P. Hastedt, "Bureaucracy," "Diplomacy," "Economic Instruments," "Military Instruments: Big Wars," and "Military Instruments: Small Wars," in *American Foreign Policy*, 10th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

F.3.a.3.c.2. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Theorizing Public Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 2008): in LEXISNEXIS (accessed June 13, 2017).

F.3.a.3.c.3. Nicholas J. Cull, *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

F.3.a.3.c.4. Melissa Hathaway, "Connected Choices: How the Internet is Challenging Sovereign Decisions," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36, no. 5 (2014): in TaylorandFrancis (accessed June 13, 2017).

F.3.a.3.c.5. David Kahn, "The Rise of Intelligence", *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 25-34 in PROQUEST (accessed June 13, 2017).

F.3.a.3.c.6. Richard Immerman, "Intelligence and Strategy: Historicizing Psychology, Policy, and Politics," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 1 (January 2008): 1-23.

F.3.a.3.c.7. Mark Duckenfield, "Fiscal Fetters: The Economic Imperatives of National Security in a Time of Austerity," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (Air University; Maxwell AFB, AL 2012), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/summer12.pdf> (accessed June 13, 2017).

F.3.a.4. Points to Consider.

F.3.a.4.a. What are the different forms of national power? In what ways are they enabling functions that support decision makers and in what ways are they instruments that allow ways to achieve objectives? What are the different methods they can be used to contribute to national policy and strategy goals?

F.3.a.4.b. How does the 21st Century strategic environment affect the potential use and limitations of the different instruments of national power? In what ways do other international actors and norms of behavior constrain the exercise of power?

F.3.e.4.c. How does presidential leadership and associated worldviews influence the uses of national power?

F.3.b. **LESSON 12: INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN TIMES OF PEACE.**

Prof. Gregory Lawless
961-2025
Mode: Lecture/Seminar

9 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-12-L/S

F.3.b.1. Introduction.

F.3.b.1.a. This lesson explores how the United States applies power to achieve objectives during peacetime, that is, how the U.S. conducts foreign policy day in and day out, when and where we are not embroiled in conflict. Conflicts are extraordinary challenges for U.S. security but, when they do occur, they are generally limited to a particular country or region, while the rest of world continues on its way peacefully. So the U.S. machinery of government must operate more or less normally in most of the world, even as we deal with conflict in part of it.

F.3.b.1.b. Instruments of power, taken together, can be called statecraft. These elements are continuously at work, differing in proportion and relation depending on objectives and influences at play in a country or region. In peacetime, soft power elements of statecraft predominate, including the bilateral and multilateral relationship building and exchanges that make up diplomatic engagements as well as, for example, development assistance, trade and investment, and cultural exchanges. The military aspects of statecraft play a supporting role, including joint exercises, mil-to-mil relations, conducting basing negotiations, and enhancing partner militaries' capabilities and professionalism.

F.3.b.1.c. Instruments of power are not equated with a particular department of the government; rather, each department participates in the application of every instrument. Officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military conduct diplomacy when they meet with foreign officials. Department of State (DOS) officials exercise military power when they deal with basing or over-flight rights, negotiate security treaties and participate in coalitions. A U.S. Navy ship visit is both a diplomatic and a military event. The threat of use of force is a diplomatic and a military exercise of national power. DOD and DOS work with many other departments with key roles in the application of U.S. economic power and information power. Congress plays a fundamental role, using powers of appropriation, conducting hearings and consultations, making official statements and through Congressional oversight/travel.

F.3.b.1.d. The instruments of power may be employed abroad by a wide array of U.S. government entities, from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture or Treasury, to multi-agency programs such as the global President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). In the last two decades, the idea of "3D" collaboration has grown merging Diplomacy and Development efforts alongside Defense in specific missions where close cooperation and coordination among U.S. departments results in enhanced projection of soft power. Similarly, soft power may be applied in a multilateral setting to harness the

coordinated energy of many governments focused on a mutual international challenge. The **Chief of Mission** concept unifies these activities of United States government representatives abroad under the authority of the U.S. ambassador in a specific country, where a **Country Team** of department and agency representatives will provide the capabilities to monitor developments and implement measures consistent with U.S. policy.

F.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

F.3.b.2.a. Understand how the United States employs the various instruments of national power in the conduct of international relations during normal, non-conflict times.

F.3.b.2.b. Analyze how the elements of statecraft interact in the pursuit of national interests, and how they are coordinated to be mutually supportive, both with respect to building bilateral relations and in addressing multinational challenges.

F.3.b.2.c. Understand how the government agencies and organizations collaborate in the employment of instruments of power during times of peace, including the definition and role of soft power.

F.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.b.3.a. Tasks. Complete the required readings. Be prepared to discuss them in conjunction with the objectives and points to consider.

F.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.

[To READ]

F.3.b.3.b.1. General Keith B. Alexander, USA (ret.) and 120 retired three- and four-star generals to the leadership of the United States House and Senate, letter regarding the federal budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Feb. 27, 2017 [http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/02/FY18 International Affairs Budget House Senate.pdf](http://www.usglc.org/downloads/2017/02/FY18_International_Affairs_Budget_House_Senate.pdf) (accessed August 14, 2017). [Online]

Note: While this recent letter focuses narrowly on the President's 2018 budget request, it succinctly illustrates the value of robust diplomatic and development lines of effort, alongside military options, in the eyes of several dozen former flag officers and other senior national security policy makers.

F.3.b.3.b.2. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Theorizing Public Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science* (March 2008): in [LEXISNEXIS](#) (accessed June 13, 2017). [Online]

F.3.b.3.b.3. Harry W. Kopp, *Career Diplomacy: Life and work in the U.S. Foreign Service* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 118-126.

[Blackboard]

F.3.b.3.b.4. Ronald E. Neumann, "Demystifying the Interagency Process and Explaining the Ambassador's Role," *The InterAgency Journal: the journal of the Simons Center*, Vol. 6 Issue 3, Summer 2015 <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IAJ-6-3-Summer-2015.pdf> (accessed August 10, 2017).

[Online]

[TO SCAN]

F.3.b.3.b.5. Rosemary Hansen and LTC Rickey L. Rife, *Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus; Improving Communications and Promoting National Security*. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA, Senior Service College Fellow Research Project [Stanford University], 1998. Also available through DTIC.

[Blackboard]

F.3.b.3.b.6. Ronald A. Walker, *Multilateral Conferences: Purposeful International Negotiation* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Chapter 14: "National Styles," 227-241.

[Blackboard]

F.3.b.3.b.7. Harry W. Kopp, [OTHER SECTIONS] *Career Diplomacy: Life and work in the U.S. Foreign Service* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 3-9, 39-59.

[Blackboard]

[TO TAKE NOTE]

F.3.b.3.b.8. "Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions," Resource Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx#basic (accessed July 6, 2017).

[Online]

F.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

F.3.b.4.a. To what ends should the U.S. Government employ the power of information? What elements are necessary for the U.S. Government to successfully build soft power, according to Professor Nye?

F.3.b.4.b. What role does domestic opinion play in the formulation of foreign policy? How do the foreign affairs agencies, including State, USAID, Commerce and Agriculture, work with other government agencies and departments to formulate policy?

F.3.b.4.c. How does the country team concept in U.S. embassies function to promote a “whole of government” approach to international relations? What are some of the tools, programs and techniques the U.S. employs to build bilateral relations?

F.3.b.4.d. How does the U.S. government balance competing policy goals, including when there is a perceived conflict between values and interests? Why and how might those values and interests change over time?

F.3.c. LESSON 13: INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN CRISIS.

Dr. Patrick Bratton
245-3352
Mode: Seminar

14 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-13-S

F.3.c.1. Introduction.

F.3.c.1.a. This lesson continues the Block III dialog on the instruments of national power by exploring how the United States applies power to achieve objectives during times of crisis. In other words, we will discuss how the U.S. conducts foreign policy during a crisis, something in-between the normal day-to-day relations we looked at in the previous lesson, but not to point of open conflict like we will examine in the following lesson. Crises represent an extraordinary challenge for U.S. security. How we employ our national power during such exceptional times is the subject of our lesson.

F.3.c.1.b. It is generally agreed that a crisis consists of: (1) a threat; (2) a surprising event; and (3) a compressed or shortened decision-making time frame. Leaders attempt to resolve the crisis with the full-spectrum of instruments of national power, short of war. **Diplomacy**, both official and non-official, is used to establish dialogue with relevant parties, and to resolve the issue through persuasion, inducements, and coercion. **Information** is managed and competing narratives are developed by the participants in the crisis. **Economic** tools are often regularly used both as inducements (carrots) and coercive tools (sticks). While the use of the **Military** tool is sometimes seen as a failure of the crisis management process, it is important to note that the military instrument often is used in a variety of ways short of engaging in direct hostilities. However, the military option can carry the danger of accidental escalation. In this lesson we look at the spectrum of tools used by the actors in the conflict.

F.3.c.1.c. This lesson will use some case studies of Sino-American crises to frame our dialog about how the U.S. and other actors use their instruments of power to achieve their aims during a crisis. For background there are two documents that lay out the policy foundations for U.S. relations with both the People's Republic of China (mainland China), and the Republic of China (Taiwan). There is a reading for the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the second compares the 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Serbia, and the 2001 EP-3 Incident. The last reading is a retrospective examination of Chinese behavior by long-time China expert Ambassador Chas Freeman.

F.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

F.3.c.2.a. Summarize how the United States (and other states) employs the various instruments of national power in the conduct of international relations during times of crisis.

F.3.c.2.b. Analyze the strengths and weakness of the various instruments of power (DIME) during a crisis.

F.3.c.2.c. Explain the challenges of orchestrating the various instruments of power during the compressed atmosphere of a crisis.

F.3.c.2.d. Explain the costs and benefits of various methods to resolve a crisis, vs. long-term effects of successful short-term actions.

F.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

F.3.c.3.a. Tasks. Complete the required readings. Be prepared to discuss them in conjunction with the objectives and points to consider.

F.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.

F.3.c.3.b.1. 1st Sino-American Communique
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

F.3.c.3.b.2. "Memorandum from President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brezizinki) to President Carter," 8 March 1977, *FRUS*,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d16> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

F.3.c.3.b.3. Wallace Thies and Patrick Bratton, "When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Straits," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 27, no. 4, (9 Dec 2004), 556-584
[Taylor&Francis](#) (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

F.3.c.3.b.4. Wu Xinbo, "Understanding Chinese and U.S. Crisis Behavior,"
Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-08, 61-76.
<http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=2&sid=ad3826b9-d5aa-48b3-8a54291cb1fd911%40sessionmgr104&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=511376890&db=ofm> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

F.3.c.3.b.5. Chas Freeman, "The Taiwan Problem and China's Strategy for Resolving it," 14 September 2011, 1-9, <http://chasfreeman.net/the-taiwan-problem-and-chinas-strategy-for-resolving-it/> (accessed June 13, 2017) [Online]

F.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.

F.3.c.3.c.1. David Houghton, *The Decision Point* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 26-29.

F.3.c.3.c.2. D. Robert Worley, "Instruments of Power," in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System* (Raleigh: Lulu Press, 2012), 275-91.

F.3.c.3.c.3. John F. Troxell, "'Military Power and the Use of Force,'" Read 1-10.

F.3.c.3.c.4. "Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter," Washington, May 10, 1978, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d99> (accessed June 13, 2017)

F.3.c.3.c.5. Robert Sutter, *US-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

F.3.c.3.c.6. Denny Roy, *Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security* (New York: Columbia University Press: 2013).

F.3.c.3.c.7. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

F.3.c.3.d. Suggested Videos

F.3.c.3.d.1. *Nightline* episode covering the 1995-96 Straits Crisis: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hghuZDuHph8> (accessed June 13, 2017)

F.3.c.3.d.2. *Nightline* report on the EP-3 incident: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gHPcCmO8BM> (accessed June 13, 2017)

F.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

F.3.c.4.a. What success did the actors achieve through the use of a particular instrument? And conversely, what challenges or failures did the actors incur?

F.3.c.4.b. What are the advantages of the use of inducement and coercive strategic approaches in these cases? What are the disadvantages? Why?

F.3.c.4.c. Which states orchestrated instruments most effectively? Which leaders distinguished themselves by their approach to the crisis?

F.3.c.4.d. Who "won" in each of these crises? What did each side "learn" about the utility of the various instruments of power as a result?

F.3.d. LESSON 14: INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN CONFLICT: THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ.

CAPT Wade Turvold
245-3238
Mode: Seminar

16 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-14-S

The United States and its friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We are meeting the threat now with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of firefighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.

—George W. Bush, 2003

F.3.d.1. Introduction.

F.3.d.1.a. This lesson is part of a block of instruction on the instruments of national power and will examine the use of these instruments, particularly the military, in time of conflict. The format for delivery is a case study that uses the George W. Bush administration's post-9/11 decision to invade Iraq in 2003 to study the myriad factors involved in a presidential decision for war. A government's most momentous decision is to take its people to war. Although the Constitution grants the Congress authority to formally declare war, the Constitution also confers upon the President great power to define and implement U.S. foreign policy. The American system has therefore evolved such that the President is usually at the center of any decision involving the use of the military.

F.3.d.1.b. Beyond formal powers, the President enjoys the authority inherent in his position to speak as the nation's executive leader to the American public, which naturally rallies around the presidency in times of crisis. Enhancing that bond with the public is a president's capacity to articulate American national interests and objectives in terms of the ideals that Americans associate with their role in the world.

F.3.d.1.c. The power of a president, however, has its limits. Congress, interest groups, the media and others respond to balance the actions of the Executive branch. In addition to being cautious not to lead where the American public will not follow, a president must also weigh the influence of the international community. In this case, the U.S. and several other states had been using their instruments of power in an attempt to shape Saddam's behavior since before the First Gulf War 12 years earlier. The outcome of this effort was ambiguous at the time the decision was made to invade in 2003.

F.3.d.1.d. In the post 9/11 era, President George W. Bush led America into a war very different in rationale and objectives than previous conflicts. Military action against Iraq was intended to eliminate weapons of mass destruction before Iraq could arm terrorist groups, and would be accomplished by toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein. In its

place, theoretically, a democratic Iraq would emerge, becoming a model for political change throughout the Middle East. President Bush's decision to force regime change in Iraq marked a departure point for American foreign policy. For Iraq in March 2003, the president espoused a new doctrine of 'preventive war.' While Congress readily supported his decision to invade Iraq, that support reflected momentary public consensus that the war was just and vital to American security.

F.3.d.1.e. This case study highlights several concepts addressed to date in TWS and NSPS, including the creation and implementation of policy and strategy, the role of values and interests, the structure of the global strategic environment, just war and IR theory. The case illustrates the role of Congress and domestic opinion, as well as the war making powers of the Executive Branch. Perhaps most importantly, the 2003 Iraq War highlights the politics and personal interaction between the President and the major stakeholders involved. The Bush administration made assumptions, considered available ways and means, and took risk to achieve goals in support of what they considered vital national interests. This case study presents an opportunity to use the strategy formulation framework, and Houghton's decision making models, to evaluate the Bush administration's decision for invasion.

F.3.d.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

F.3.d.2.a. Assess the global environment, domestic environment, national interests, assumptions, policy, and risk factors of a presidential decision to go to war.

F.3.d.2.b. Apply the strategy formulation framework to the decision to invade Iraq.

F.3.d.2.c. Apply Houghton's decision making models to the decision to invade Iraq.

F.3.d.3. Student Requirements.

F.3.d.3.a. Tasks. Complete assigned readings and be prepared to discuss them in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

F.3.d.3.b. Required Readings.

F.3.d.3.b.1. Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 221-48. [Blackboard]

F.3.d.3.b.2. David Patrick Houghton, *The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 218-47. [Blackboard]

F.3.d.3.c. Suggested Readings.

F.3.d.3.c.1. William T. Allison, *The Gulf War, 1990-91* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 1-39 and 145-165.

F.3.d.3.c.2. Andrew J. Polsky, *Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 273-325.

F.3.d.3.c.3. David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 389-447.

F.3.d.3.c.4. Joseph J. Collins, *Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2008), www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a479692.pdf (accessed June 13, 2017).

F.3.d.3.c.5. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

F.3.d.3.c.6. Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

F.3.d.3.c.7. Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015).

F.3.d.3.d. Suggested Videos.

F.3.d.3.d.1. Michael Kirk, "Bush's War," Part 1, *PBS Frontline*, March 24, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maOZwxVA3X4> (accessed June 13, 2017)

F.3.d.4. Points to Consider.

F.3.d.4.a. What is the history of Iraq and the United States in the Gulf region and how did it affect decision making? How did the First Gulf War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 impact the history of the region?

F.3.d.4.b. How can the three IR lenses, realism, liberalism and constructivism, explain the foreign policy actions of the George W. Bush administration?

F.3.d.4.c. What unique aspects of the American political system enabled and affected the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003?

F.3.d.4.d. What are the key aspects of decision making as it relates to strategy? How do various decision making models illuminate the Bush administration's decision for war? What role did assumptions play in the decision to invade? What about risk assessment?

F.3.d.4.e. Iraq had been under economic sanctions since the First Gulf War, a military no fly zone had been active for most of the same period, and the U.S. had been using

diplomacy to attempt to alter Saddam's conduct for longer than that. Evaluate the effectiveness of the use of those instruments of national power at the onset of the 2003 conflict?

F.3.d.4.f. Was this a just war?

F.3.d.4.g. How did George W. Bush manage civil-military relations? How did he manage international relations with friends, allies and enemies?

F.3.d.4.h. How strong was the Bush Administration's "Coalition of the Willing?" What was the impact of not gaining UN support for military action?

G. BLOCK IV.

G.1. CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY.

All States have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states, with their own “grand strategies.”

—Edward Luttwak
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, p. 409

This block further examines U.S. purpose, interests, and values as articulated in the current National Security Strategy, and consequently America’s position in the contemporary international order. We will focus on how the national security system employs foresight, develops policy, formulates strategy, allocates resources, gathers feedback, and assesses progress and outcomes. We will examine the role of DOD strategic documents in interpreting and expanding on the National Security Strategy and other presidential guidance, while also focusing on understanding potential strategic options. Finally, we evaluate America’s strategic position, potential options and the need and role for continuous revitalization and reform of U.S. national security processes.

G.2. OBJECTIVES.

G.2.a. Assess the role of DOD strategy documents in U.S. policy and strategy formulation.

G.2.b. Appraise the President’s strategic vision and guidance.

G.2.c. Appraise America’s grand strategy and purpose in the contemporary security environment.

G.3. LESSONS.

G.3.a. LESSON 15: NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE & POSTURE.

Col Ed Kaplan
245-3341
Mode: Seminar

17 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-15-S

The basic principles of strategy are so simple that a child may understand them. But to determine their proper application to a given situation requires the hardest kind of work.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

G.3.a.1. Introduction.

G.3.a.1.a. In this lesson students will study key documents that describe, inform, and influence U.S. national security strategies. To this point in the course we have examined a framework for developing strategy at the strategic level and during this lesson we will look at actual documents that describe our national strategic posture, our aims and goals and communicate the ways and means to achieve them. We will study this topic chronologically because although the documents do notionally exist in a hierarchy, they are not authored that way. Instead, they reflect both the governing documents and events since that document was written. They are rooted in both hierarchy and time.

We begin by examining the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, followed by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Next, we look at two critiques of the QDR: an explicit one from outside DoD and Congress, and the implicit criticism in the 2015 NDAA. The 2015 National Security Strategy follows, with a critique from OSD(P). The election year 2016 National Military Strategy rounds out the Obama administration documents. It's followed by the 2016 and 2017 NDAAs, which contain implicit critiques of the NMS. Finally, we have documents produced by the Trump administration. From the week of the inauguration, we have the first policy guidance.

G.3.a.1.b. While DOD plays its own unique role in supporting and implementing the NSS, Congress also plays an important although less direct role. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 amended the law and changed the name of QDR review to the **Defense Strategy Review (DSR)** and directs several substantive changes to how DOD must conduct its review - including the requirement for a greater level of specificity, an identification of tradeoffs and a greater overall articulation of defense strategy, among others. Congress directed this adjustment based on the perception that the QDR process had migrated away from the long-term planning document they originally intended (a perspective also held by the 2014 NDP, a panel of experienced national security professionals chartered to review the 2014 QDR).

G.3.a.1.c. Since strategy and policy must respond to a fluid strategic environment, change is inevitable. Thus, the formulation of strategy and policy cannot remain static. Instead, this formulation must be an interactive and iterative process if a state is to successfully adapt to changing geopolitical realities and account for emerging challenges and new dynamics such as Russian aggression against Ukraine, rising tensions in the South China Sea or the rise of ISIL. They must address domestic considerations such as the strength or weakness of the economy (for example what occurred during the 2008-2009 recession.) The “monitor for success, failure, or modification” block of the strategy formulation model represents this process of adaptation in relation to an ever-changing environment. Even an examination of strategic documents over just a four year span beginning with the DSG published in 2012 and extending to the NSS in 2015 provides an indication of how these documents must evolve.

G.3.a.1.d. Previous lessons in NSPS revealed the complexity of strategy and policy formulation in an uncertain world. There has been extensive and spirited discussion among practitioners and scholars in the past few years regarding the future of American grand strategy. Some have argued that the United States is incapable of formulating such an articulation of national goals because of the lack of a foreign policy consensus. Others contend that the dynamic nature of the strategic environment calls for new thinking about American national security objectives in view of a changing world order, perhaps the end of the liberal order established in the aftermath of World War II. While still others will argue that we do have a grand strategy and the NSS is the embodiment of it. Given these circumstances, one might rightfully ask, “What is America’s grand strategy today?” This lesson seeks to provide a basis for answering these questions by examining the principal documents that are meant to articulate American strategy, the complex ways that these documents are developed and their meaning for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in the contemporary world.

G.3.a.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, the student should be able to:

G.3.a.2.a. Explain the hierarchy and interrelationship of national security documents including the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

G.3.a.2.b. Summarize the difference between the abstractly logical and interlocking nature of the executive branch documents and the real-world processes and their outcomes.

G.3.a.2.c. Explain the role of Congress in guiding the direction of U.S. national security strategy.

G.3.a.2.d. Assess the Trump administration’s formal and informal strategic guidance, and evaluate their role and implications in relation to U.S. national security interests.

G.3.a.2.e. Evaluate U.S. national security strategy documents through the lens of the U.S. Army War College Strategy Formulation Framework.

G.3.a.3. Student Requirements

G.3.a.3.a. Tasks. Be prepared to discuss the readings in conjunction with the learning objectives and the points to consider.

G.3.a.3.b. Required Readings.

G.3.a.3.b.1. U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 1-8, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.2. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014), Read cover letter and Executive Summary (III-XV); scan remainder, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017) (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) Note 1. **The 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) renames the QDR the Defense Strategy Review and directs changes in how it is to be conducted.** [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.3. The National Defense Panel, *Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute for Peace July 2014), Read cover letter and Executive Summary (1-7), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2014/07/release-national-defense-panel-report-ensuring-strong-us-defense-future> (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.4. U.S. Congress, Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, December 2014), Read sec. 1072 pages 226-231 (6 pages), <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo55528> (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally). [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.5. Barack Obama, “Introduction,” *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Whitehouse, February 2015), 1-14, scan remainder, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.6. Michele Flournoy, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 8, 2015, 3, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Flournoy_12-08-15.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.7. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2015), Read Chairman's forward (i) and main body of document I, 1-17, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Flournoy_12-08-15.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.8. U.S. Congress, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, January 2016), Read sec. 1072 pages 226-231. (6 pages) Read sec. 1064 pages 264-265. (1 page), <https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr1735/BILLS-114hr1735enr.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.9. U.S. Congress, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, November 2016), Read sec. 941-945 pages 369-375. (6 pages) <https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt840/CRPT-114hrpt840.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.10. Senate Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress), 4, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY17%20NDAA%20Bill%20Summary.pdf> (accessed March 16, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally) [Online]

G.3.a.3.b.11. Donald Trump, NSPM, Subject: Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces, January 27, 2017. <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02282/rebuilding-the-us-armed-forces> (accessed June 14, 2017) [Online]

G.3.a.3.c. Suggested Readings.

G.3.a.3.c.1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future* (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, February 2016), <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/696435/2017-defense-posture-statement-posted-on-defensegov/> (accessed June 14, 2017). (Must use Firefox or Access Externally)

G.3.a.3.c.2. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18th Chairman's 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense) 1- 4, http://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/CJCS_2nd_Term_Strategic_Direction.pdf (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.a.3.c.3. Colin Gray, "Politics and War" in *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 58-64.

G.3.a.3.c.4. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-1988," *The National Interest* 11 (Spring 1988): 65-75.

G.3.a.3.c.5. Barry Posen, "Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy," *Orbis* 51, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 561-67.

G.3.a.4. Points to Consider.

G.3.a.4.a. What is the role of strategic guidance documents? Are they a description of grand strategy guiding foreign policy and national security decisions, whether or not that strategy is clearly articulated? Do they provide clarity on what should be done or simply broad contours of what the administration would like to have done? Should we consider these documents "strategy" documents that describe a balanced application of ends, ways and means...or are they actually "policy" documents that inform the development of strategy over the coming months and years?

G.3.a.4.b. What are the priorities in President Obama's National Security Strategy? What are the challenges or threats that have been identified? How were the national instruments of power integrated into the 2015 NSS and how did members of the executive branch use this document to develop a "whole of government approach"?

G.3.a.4.c. What role does Congress play in developing these strategic documents? Do they play a direct or an indirect role? What leverage does the Congress have if they don't believe their voice is heard?

G.3.b. LESSON 16: THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.

Dr. Larry Goodson
245-3261
Mode: Seminar

20 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-16-S

G.3.b.1. Introduction.

G.3.b.1.a. This lesson serves as an opportunity to consider the myriad current international security issues facing those charged with informing or acting in the national decision-making process. The NSPS course focuses on the students' ability to understand and apply the Strategy Formulation Framework to review and recommend modifications to U.S. policy. This lesson challenges the students to draw on important course concepts and theory along with the Strategy Formulation Framework by addressing potential national security issues of major importance to the United States.

G.3.b.1.b. For this lesson students will read about various regional and international issues, including the revival of Great Power politics (the Russian resurgence, the rise of China), ISIS and the Syrian War, and nuclear proliferation. Students will review existing U.S. policy and strategy regarding these complex problems that are likely to confront national security professionals now and in the near future. Students will be required to synthesize course material in developing their responses to the identified issues.

G.3.b.1.c. During the seminar, students will engage in a thorough discussion of the issues and outline potential U.S. policy and strategy considerations.

G.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

G.3.b.2.a. Summarize the complexity of preparing for the emerging global security environment in the first quarter of the 21st century and the exercise of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power.

G.3.b.2.b. Apply key course concepts to understand and assess a given national security issue/threat.

G.3.b.2.c. Synthesize and apply multiple aspects of the relationship between, and the relative importance of, the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of statecraft, with the goal of coordinating them towards a common end.

G.3.b.2.d. Apply the Strategy Formulation Framework to develop approaches for addressing a given national security issue in the form of a policy review.

G.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

G.3.b.3.a. Tasks.

G.3.b.3.a.1. Critically examine contemporary international security issues in the context of U.S. interests.

G.3.b.3.a.2. Explain and discuss U.S. interests in dealing with the security issues and consider them in the context of the DIME to comprehend how integrated options might facilitate resolution.

G.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.

G.3.b.3.b.1. Michael V. Hayden, "Tectonics," *World Affairs*, 179.2, Summer 2016, 4-8. [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.b.2. Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), Introduction, Ch. 9 (skim), Conclusion. [Blackboard]

Or

G.3.b.3.b.3. Richard Haass, *A World in Disarray* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), Ch. 10. [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.b.4. H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn, "America First Doesn't Mean America Alone," *Wall Street Journal*, May 30, 2017. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1903624345/5E6E61F7971D4B4CPQ/9?accountid=4444> (accessed October 20, 2017) [Online]

G.3.b.3.c. Focused Readings.

G.3.b.3.c.1. Russia.

G.3.b.3.c.1.a. Julianne Smith, *The future of U.S.-Russia relations* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.1.b. Andrew Monaghan, "The 'War' in Russia's 'Hybrid Warfare'," *Parameters* 45.4 (Winter 2015/2016), 65-74. [Online]

Or

G.3.b.3.c.1.c. Andrew J. Duncan, "New 'Hybrid War' or 'Old Dirty Tricks'? The Gerasimov Debate and Russia's Response to the Contemporary Operating Environment," *Canadian Military Journal* 17.3 (July 2017), 6-16. [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.c.1.d. Graham Allison and Dimitri K. Simes, "Russia and America: Stumbling to War," *National Interest* (April 20, 2015): 1-6,

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-stumbling-war-12662?page=8>
(accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.2. China.

G.3.b.3.c.2.a. William Choong, "China's South China Sea strategy: simply brilliant," *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 18, 2015, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-south-china-sea-strategy-simply-brilliant/> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.2.b. Peter Ferdinand, "Westward ho—the China Dream and 'One Belt, One Road': Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping," *International Affairs* 92.4 (2016), 941-957. [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.3. ISIS and Syria

G.3.b.3.c.3.a. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "After ISIS: U.S. Political-Military Strategy in the Global War on Terror," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (March 10, 2017) 1-21. [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.c.3.b. Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *The Atlantic* (March 2015): 1-43, <http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.3.c. Larry P. Goodson, "The Great Middle Eastern War," *Parameters* (under review for publication). [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.c.3.d. John Bew, "The Syrian War and the return of great power politics," *New Statesman* (December 15, 2015), <http://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2015/12/syrian-war-and-return-great-power-politics> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.4. Nuclear Nonproliferation

G.3.b.3.c.4.a. Patrick Morgan, "North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Nonproliferation or Deterrence? Or Both?," in Sung Chull Kim and Michael D. Cohen, Eds., *North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017). [Blackboard]

G.3.b.3.c.4.b. Khurshid Khan, "Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for South Asia," *Stimson Center Report*, (June 14, 2012), <http://www.stimson.org/content/limited-war-under-nuclear-umbrella-and-its-implications-south-asia> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.4.c. National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC, "Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technology," (Washington, DC: January 31, 2011), <https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/dnnfactsheet2011> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.3.c.4.d. White House, The Historic Deal that will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon (Washington, DC: The White House), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

G.3.b.4.a. Do the current national policies create an adequate framework for strategy formulation and development for the issues under consideration?

G.3.b.4.b. What are the potential regional and global threats, challenges and opportunities presented by the contemporary strategic issues? How could the various instruments of national power be used to achieve U.S. policy objectives and protect America's national security interests? How might these be used to further protect those interests and objectives of allies, partners and other regional players?

G.3.b.4.c. What U.S. statutes and Congressional mandates must the Executive Branch take into consideration as part of the policy formulation process? What potential effects does your recommended policy or strategy have on the U.S. domestic environment? Does your policy require changes to these statutes/mandates?

G.3.b.4.d. What possible second- or third-order consequences might be involved in any U.S. policy response to the contemporary strategic issues considered?

G.3.c. **LESSON 17: 21st CENTURY AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY.**

COL Bob Hamilton
245-3278
Mode: Lecture/Seminar

21 November 2017
0830-1130
NSPS-17-L/S

G.3.c.1. Introduction.

G.3.c.1.a. In this lesson, we will examine U.S. grand strategy with a focus on the near future – the next 10-15 years. We will start by examining trends in current U.S. grand strategy, critiques of the grand strategic direction of the U.S., and recommendations for grand strategy. Of course, it is first necessary to define what we mean by “grand strategy.” As noted in the course overview and in Lesson 1 of this course, while we have settled on a definition of grand strategy as the use of all instruments of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve national objectives, this definition is not used universally. While there are multiple definitions, most of them share several key tenets. Some of the more well-known definitions of grand strategy are below:

G.3.c.1.a.1. B.H. Liddell Hart – strategy is about winning the war; grand strategy takes the longer view, it is about winning the peace.

G.3.c.1.a.2. Edwin M. Earle – grand strategy so integrates the resources of a nation that war is either unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.

G.3.c.1.a.3. Walter A. McDougall – an equation of ends and means so sturdy that it triumphs despite serial setbacks at the level of strategy, operations or campaigns.

G.3.c.1.a.4. Tami Davis Biddle - grand strategy identifies and articulates a given political actor’s security objectives at a particular point in time, and describes how they will be achieved using a combination of instruments of power -- including military, diplomatic, and economic instruments.

G.3.c.1.b. The shared tenets of these definitions of grand strategy imply a whole-of-government approach; and that it takes the longer and broader view, rather than being focused on a specific issue or region. Of course, the basic question is “does the U.S. have a grand strategy”, or is the U.S. simply reacting to one crisis after another? We will examine the proposed approaches to grand strategy from several noted authors in the foreign policy/international relations field. These authors have diverse opinions about what priorities should drive grand strategy, and what “ways” might be most effective. Apply what you have learned in both NSPS and TWS to determine which alternatives are most likely to preserve U.S. security and advance U.S. national interests.

G.3.c.1.c. For this final lesson of NSPS students are asked to prepare an outline of forward thinking U.S. grand strategy. What should U.S. grand strategy for the next 10-

15 years be based on? What are your own beliefs about the position the U.S. should maintain in the world? What should national interests be and how should the U.S. pursue these interests? This grand strategy should reflect serious consideration of the array of international and domestic security challenges facing the United States.

G.3.c.1.d. In broad terms, what major changes would your strategy require in resourcing, military force structure, basing and employment, involvement in international organizations, etc.? Be prepared to discuss the suitability, acceptability, and feasibility of your choices.

G.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

G.3.c.2.a. Assess America's objectives in the emerging international environment and the challenges and opportunities that will shape American grand strategy.

G.3.c.2.b. Assess alternative grand strategies and identify or develop one that will best posture the United States to advance its national interests over the next decade.

G.3.c.2.c. Assess the resource implications of competing American grand strategic options.

G.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

G.3.c.3.a. Tasks.

G.3.c.3.a.1. Critically examine the alternative grand strategies presented in the readings and identify the IR theories that inform each alternative.

G.3.c.3.a.2. Critically examine the current grand strategic direction of the U.S. and discuss why you do or do not believe it serves America's long-term, strategic interests.

G.3.c.3.a.3. Be prepared to articulate your own grand strategy for the U.S., and explain why you believe it is best suited to advancing U.S. interests in the emerging strategic environment.

G.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.

G.3.c.3.b.1. Glenn P. Hastedt, "Alternative Futures" in *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 367-79.

[Student Issue]

G.3.c.3.b.2. Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order", *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2017),

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt>

(accessed June 14, 2017).

[Online]

G.3.c.3.b.3. Taesuh Cha, "The Return of Jacksonianism: The International Implications of the Trump Phenomenon", *The Washington Quarterly* (39:4, Winter 2017), 83-97. [Blackboard]

G.3.c.3.b.4. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "After ISIS: U.S. Political-Military Strategy in the Global War on Terror", *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments* (March 10, 2017) 1-21. [Blackboard]

G.3.c.3.b.5. James Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy," (Hoover Institution, February 26, 2015), <http://www.hoover.org/research/new-american-grand-strategy> (accessed June 14, 2017). [Online]

G.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.

G.3.c.3.c.1. Anne-Marie Brady, "Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns," *The Diplomat* (March 17, 2014), <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns/> (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.3.c.2. Peter Harris, "Back to Balancing? Ukraine, the Status Quo, and American Grand Strategy in 2014," *The National Interest* (May 19, 2014), <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/back-balancing-ukraine-the-status-quo-american-grand-10487> (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.3.c.3. Charles Kupchan, "Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future," *Democracy* 23 (Winter 2012): 9-18 in PROQUEST (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.3.c.4. Robert D. Kaplan & Stephen S. Kaplan, "America Primed," *The National Interest* 112 (March/April 2011): 42-54 in PROQUEST (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.3.c.5. Joseph Nye, "The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2010): 2-12 in PROQUEST (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.3.c.6. Brent Scowcroft, "The World in Transformation," *The National Interest* 119 (May/June 2012): 7-9 in PROQUEST (accessed June 14, 2017).

G.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

G.3.c.4.a. Should the quest to maintain American primacy, of itself, be a driving force behind U.S. behavior in the world? Can you envision ways in which a determined quest for ongoing primacy might be detrimental to long-term U.S. interests?

G.3.c.4.b. If not maintenance of American primacy, what should be the central tenet of an American grand strategy? Is it possible to develop a grand strategy that promotes U.S. interests while also promoting the interests of key allies and potential adversaries?


G.3.c.4.c. What are the risks inherent in various grand strategy options? How might allies and potential adversaries react to changes in American behavior resulting from a shift in grand strategy?

G.3.c.4.d. Does the “America First” doctrine articulated by the Trump Administration mark a major departure for American Grand Strategic tradition, or does it have roots in the Grand Strategies pursued by previous U.S. administrations? How might such a doctrine be implemented? What constraints might the administration encounter in pursuing its Grand Strategy?

H. APPENDIX I.

GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION.

H.1. General. Strategy is an art. It is also somewhat scientific, in that it follows certain patterns that require a common understanding of terminology, adherence to certain principles, and disciplined, albeit creative, thought processes. Remember that these strategy formulation guidelines are not formulas. Strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time, place and personalities involved. Nevertheless, these guidelines offer an approach to address the complexity of strategy, and are intended for strategists attempting to achieve the coherence, continuity, and consensus that policymakers seek in designing, developing and executing national security and military strategies.



H.2. National Purpose. This is the starting point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national purpose represent the legal, philosophical and moral basis for continuation of the American system. From the nation's purpose—as well as an understanding of the nation's domestic and global needs—the United States derives its enduring core national interests. The strategist should return to these considerations in terms of risk assessment at every derivative level of strategy formulation.

H.3. National Interests. There have historically been four generally agreed upon core U.S. national interests: physical security—defined as protection against attack on the territory and people of the United States in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and institutions intact; promotion of values; stable international order; and economic prosperity. These have changed little during the course of U.S. history with the Preamble to our Constitution declaring that its purpose was to “provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

H.4. At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve U.S. core national interests are based on the national leadership's strategic vision of what America's role in the world should be to safeguard these national interests. All administrations focus on national interests, but the administration perspective is shaped by assessments of threats and opportunities by senior advisors, personal beliefs of the President, and the decision making process and culture established by the President. Through these aspects and the unique circumstances of each administration, presidents establish different strategic visions of America's role in the world, often causing them to emphasize certain national interests over others. As noted in lesson 1, a consideration of grand strategy – in other words, thinking about the use of all instruments of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America's role in the world that will best achieve national objectives – can be seen as inherent in the process of defining one's strategic vision. However, grand strategy is rarely articulated as a cohesive, structured, and concise document or set of ideas such as in NSC-68. Thus strategic vision may serve as a more graspable concept that incorporates the myriad of ways in which an administration communicates its perception of the world and the future path of a nation.

H.4.a. From the founding of the American republic to the present day, national leaders and the populace have embraced a variety of views on how best to attain U.S. national interests. These views have ranged from isolationism, that is, a non-interventionist stance, to global engagement.

H.4.b. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, led the nation in a time of global economic depression followed by a massive world war during which he moved the American grand strategic vision from non-intervention in European affairs to active global engagement with numerous nation-states to defeat Nazi Germany. Within five years of the end of the Second World War, President Harry Truman articulated a grand strategic vision of global engagement with the focus on containing an

expansionist Soviet Union that the United States feared would dominate Eurasia. To meet that challenge, the Truman administration made substantial investments in U.S. military power. The grand strategy of containment dominated U.S. strategic thinking until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Today the United States maintains a strong commitment to global engagement, albeit with shifts in the application of ways and means that is subject to tensions created by competing interests in sustaining continuity in favorable aspects of the international order while at the same time pursuing beneficial changes to that order.

H.5. National Policy. Based on grand strategic decisions, the United States political leadership provides national policy in the form of broad guidance concerning America's global role in pursuit of core national interests. These published and public policies are only the start point for strategy formulation at the national level. National policy is conveyed in many iterative and cumulative forms ranging from formal national security directives and pronouncements in presidential and cabinet-level speeches to presidential replies to press queries and cabinet-level appearances on current affairs television shows. An astute and informed participant in U.S. policy and strategy must work constantly to understand, interpret, and align his or her agency or institution with overarching policy.

H.6. Strategy Formulation Process

H.6.a. General

H.6.a.1. Inherent in this strategy process is an appropriate degree of analysis designed to illuminate alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties. A general outline for this phase of a strategy process follows:

H.6.a.1.a. Identify and determine U.S. interests.

H.6.a.1.b. Determine level of intensity for each interest.

H.6.a.1.c. Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) in regard to interests.

H.6.a.1.d. Identify policy objectives (ends).

H.6.a.1.e. Consider alternative concepts (ways) that use resources (means) to achieve objectives.

H.6.a.1.f. Determine the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of the strategic options.

H.6.a.1.g. Conduct a risk assessment.

H.6.a.1.h. Present strategy recommendations.

H.6.a.2. The analysis must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful, it must examine and explain which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected. The analysis should seek to identify opportunities and threats to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the strategic analysis may not only be influenced by current national policy, but may help identify recommendations for policy makers to consider for changes to existing policies or for the creation of new policies. The analysis should address most (if not all) of the following questions:

H.6.a.2.a. What is the current U.S. policy or precedent?

H.6.a.2.b. Who are the critical actors?

H.6.a.2.c. What are their interests and/or policies?

H.6.a.2.d. With whom does the United States have convergence or divergence of interest/policy?

H.6.a.2.e. What are the other feasible options to employ U.S. power to implement the strategy options under consideration?

H.6.a.2.f. How will the strategy be sustained?

H.6.a.3. The strategy formulation guidelines delineated above can apply equally to all formal national security documents (i.e., National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, theater military strategy, etc.). The strategist must be able to develop strategies employing all of the elements of power. Students at the USAWC will develop and practice these skills in NSPS, elective courses, and the National Security Staff Rides. Remember, the formulation of strategy at any level employs the strategic thought process based on the aligning of Ends, Ways, and Means.

H.6.b. National Interests. During the strategy formulation process, the strategist moves beyond the core grand strategic interests to more specific national security interests derived from those core interests in accordance with national policy. These national security interests provide more detail to the nation's needs and aspirations, in terms of the relationship between the foreign and domestic aspects of national security, and are thus the start point for defining policy objectives for national security related strategies.

H.6.b.1. As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the nation, and written as desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. For example, U.S. national interests might be stated as:

H.6.b.1.a. Access to raw materials – (not “Protect sources of raw materials”).

H.6.b.1.b. Unrestricted passage through international waters – (not “Secure sea lines of communications”).

H.6.b.2. Intensity of interests: Determining the level of intensity helps to determine priority of interests, recognizing that without prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative objectives and the consequent mismatch of those policy objectives (ends) with resources (means). Degrees of intensity are determined by answering the question: What happens if the interest is not realized? The U.S. Army War College uses the following four degrees of intensity to classify interests:

H.6.b.2.a. Survival/Existential: if not attained, will have catastrophic results for the nation

H.6.b.2.b. Vital: if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for national interests.

H.6.b.2.c. Important: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect national interests.

H.6.b.2.d. Peripheral: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect national interests.

H.6.c. Ends-Ways-Means:

H.6.c.1. Objectives are derived from national policy and from a detailed consideration of United States' national interests by category and intensity against the backdrop of issues, trends and challenges (threats and opportunities) that affect those interests. Based on these objectives, strategists then consider alternative concepts and courses of action for the use of the national elements of power. Note the primacy of the objectives—strategy should be ends-driven, not resource-driven, in order to ensure maximum opportunity to achieve the objectives.

H.6.c.2. Identifying and defining the policy objective (end), therefore, is a critical first step in the strategy formulation process. Understanding the objective is critical to formulating strategy.

H.6.c.3. Once the policy objective is identified, strategists consider the range of resources (means) available, and then examine potential ways to employ these resources in pursuit of the objectives. While strategy should remain ends-focused, ways are necessarily resource-constrained. (For example: Unless a state has nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be adopted in developing its security strategy, that is, there is no “mutually assured destruction.” Therefore, the state must find alternative ways to enhance security or deter attack by a nuclear-capable adversary.)

H.6.d. Suitability, Acceptability and Feasibility (SAF): Once potential strategy options are identified, each option must be examined to determine suitability (Will it achieve the objectives?), acceptability (Does it have necessary constituent support? Is it legal? Ethical? Worth the cost?) and feasibility (Are the means available to execute the ways?). This evaluation process, often described as a “SAF test,” enables the

strategist to evaluate the likelihood of success for each option and to select that strategy deemed most likely to attain the objectives with available means and in an acceptable way. Before a final strategy is recommended or adopted, however, each option must also be subjected to a risk assessment.

H.6.e. Risk Assessment: As discussed in TWS, there is no set, objective formula or process for assessing risk. Each case will be different and the risk involved will depend significantly on the overall context from which the strategy emerges. Nonetheless, strategists can examine risk from three closely interrelated perspectives: intrinsic, external, and implementation. Intrinsic risk concerns the relationship among the ends, ways, and means of a strategy. If the objective (end) is too big for the resources allocated, or the ways under consideration are inappropriate for the means or ends, or that the concept (way) envisioned is too grandiose for the available means and ends – then the strategist has identified intrinsic risk in the strategy. External risk concerns all of the actors (domestic and international) that can influence the development or implementation of the strategy. Domestic actors might include, for example, legislative bodies, the courts, other departments of government, public opinion, interest groups, or the media. International actors or influences could include: allies or coalition partners, international organizations, international law, non-state actors, or economic conditions. Implementation risk is similarly complex. Implementation is where Clausewitz's famous observations about the fog of war and friction most readily come into play. Questions to be asked to uncover implementation risk include the following: What might derail the proposed strategy? How might the object of the strategy likely react? What are the potential negative consequences of executing the strategy as designed? Thinking about implementation risk involves considering the "second and third order effects" or consequences of the strategy that might not be obvious at the time of formulation.

H.6.f. Continuous Assessment (Monitor for Success, Failure or Modification). Strategies rarely submit to linear and discrete parameters, hence, the last step shown in the Strategy Formulation Framework is one of continuous assessment to monitor or review the strategy as it is being implemented. Continuous assessment should be a formalized, recurring process during the life of the strategy that evaluates the strategy's effectiveness in attaining policy objectives. The strategic environment is dynamic and continuous change is inherent. Strategies that are successful may present new opportunities or require a new strategy to account for the conditions of success. Strategies that are failing beg for replacement. In addition, unforeseen changes in the strategic environment may occur that justify modification of some aspects of an existing strategy, but are not significant enough to invalidate the greater whole of the strategy. Lastly, national interests and policy can also change over time and as a result new strategies or modification(s) to existing strategies may be appropriate. Ideally, properly formulated strategy is constructed with inherent flexibility and adaptability in its statements of ways and means to serve particular ends. Continuous changes beyond requirements of success, failure and changed conditions, beyond the control of the formulators of the strategy, may be indicators of poor strategic thinking or a flawed strategy formulation process. Nonetheless, both the

strategic environment and the strategy are continuously assessed to ensure strategy supports the directing policy and interests appropriately.

I. APPENDIX II.

COURSE WRITING REQUIREMENTS and GUIDELINES.

I.1. General. During the NSPS course, each student will complete two written requirements consisting of a short decision paper detailing a proposed strategy and a longer paper intended to provide background information on the issue and the reason for the decision recommended. These papers will be graded as a single assignment and together will comprise 70% of the final course grade. Students may write their papers on any of topics in lesson 16 (The 21st Century Strategic Environment). Specific requirements follow.

I.2. Decision Paper.

I.2.a. Purpose. The primary purpose of the papers is to further your ability to think critically and analytically about national security policy. To accomplish this goal you will have to synthesize and apply material learned throughout the course. Because synthesizing and articulating policy in a short amount of time or space is a key leader skill, a secondary purpose of both papers is to improve your ability to prepare succinct written products that provide relevant depth of analysis and a sound recommendation.

I.2. b. Requirement. A decision paper provides a very brief yet comprehensive analysis of an issue, explains to the decision-maker the impact of the decision he or she is being asked to make, and provides a recommendation. This requirement will test your ability to synthesize large amounts of information into a brief paper designed to allow a senior leader to make an important decision in an environment where time is at a premium and an exhaustive review of the issue's background is often not possible. The paper must be concise in framing the issue and possible options available. Concise background analysis must directly relate to the decision, and may include a history of the problem as it relates to the decision (why the decision must be made now and what decisions or events led us to have to make this policy decision).

I.2.c. The decision paper will be one page, single-spaced, using one inch margins. Font should be Arial 12 pitch.

I.2.c.1. Issue. A brief statement of the policy that requires a strategy for implementation.

I.2.c.2. Background. A concise overview of relevant information to allow a decision-maker to understand the issue and make an informed decision. This section should include:

I.2.c.2.a. Strategies considered to implement this policy, using the ends-ways-means construct.

I.2.c.2.b. Historical or other information relevant to the decision.

I.2.c.2.c. Impact, or why the issue is important and the decision must be made now.

I.2.c.3. Recommendation.

I.2.c.3.a. Begin with a brief statement of the recommended strategy and supporting rationale.

I.2.c.3.b. Compare the recommended strategy with those not recommended.

I.2.c.3.c. Test the recommended strategy using the SAF-R test (save the testing of the strategies not recommended for the longer background paper).

NOTE: This section should not include any new information or decision criteria not already included in your previous analysis.

I.3. Background Paper. This paper will conduct a more detailed analysis of the policy decision assigned by each Seminar's FI and more comprehensively describe, compare and test the various strategies considered to implement it. In addition, this paper allows space for detailed historical background on the policy decision under consideration. As opposed to the decision paper, which is designed to be written in a spare, economical style, with as few words as possible used to express points or concepts, this paper is more academic in style, and more detail is appropriate. The background paper is usually written first, and then the decision paper condenses the key points and recommendations of the background paper into a format and style that allows a senior policy-maker to make an informed decision in a time-constrained environment.

I.3.a. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to provide the decision-maker more detailed, comprehensive analysis of and background on the issue under consideration, in the event he or she feels this level of detail is required in order to make a decision.

I.3.b. Requirement. The core of this requirement consists of 6-8 pages per the provided format. **The paper must articulate the policy objective and executive decision. The paper must outline possible strategic options available for consideration. Background analysis must directly relate to the strategic options.**

I.3.c. **Format. The paper will have 6-8 double spaced pages, using one-inch margins. Font should be Arial 12 pitch.** While the focus of the paper is on content, **each background paper must adhere to a general format** and contain certain essential elements:

I.3.c.1. Policy Decision and Objective(s): An articulation of the policy decision that requires a strategy. A description of the policy objective and ends defined in the Policy Decision.

I.3.c.2. Background (National Interests): A statement of the national interests affected by the policy decision and strategy implementation.

I.3.c.3. Strategy Options.

I.3.c.3.a. Describe, in a few paragraphs, strategies considered for the proposed policy option to achieve the stated policy objective. In short, what are the strategies the U.S. could select to implement the policy option? For each strategy discussed, tie together the objectives/ends with the ways and means needed to achieve the objective. The strategy should take into consideration all elements of national power, as well as key domestic and global forces and trends, as detailed in the Strategy Formulation Framework (there is no requirement to discuss all of these; instead, discuss only those that play key roles in the strategies under consideration).

I.3.c.3.b. The strategy should describe how the elements of national power complement each other, whether and how they might operate together, or how they might comprehensively support the strategy. You also should identify if any conflict exists between the elements of power. Does the strategy rely primarily on only one of the elements of power (military, or economic, or diplomatic, etc.)? If so, why? Does this increase risk?

I.3.c.4. Analysis and Comparison of Strategy Options: Evaluate each proposed strategy option in terms of feasibility, acceptability, suitability, and risk. Address second- or third-order consequences of the strategy. What is the desired response? What is the anticipated response? What critical indicators might require a revision of the proposed strategy? What actions can mitigate risk?

I.3.c.5. Recommendation: Briefly restate the strategy recommended to implement the policy option given, and explain why you chose it. What are its advantages - in terms of the integration of instruments of national power, and in terms of the FAS-R test – over those strategies not chosen?

I.4. Evaluation. Both papers will be evaluated based on *content, organization, and style, IAW the Communicative Arts Program Directive*, with emphasis on content. The criteria for evaluating the papers will address the student's demonstrated ability to understand and apply course concepts, to organize material logically, to express thoughts using standard written English expected of educated senior officers and officials. Descriptions of the criteria for "Outstanding," "Exceeds Standards," "Meets Standards," "Needs Improvement," and "Fails to Meet Standards" are found in the *Communicative Arts Directive*. A paper evaluated as "Needs Improvement" or "Fails to Meet Standards" will be returned for rework and resubmission.

I.5. Due Dates. Both papers are due to DNSS Faculty Instructors no later than close of business on Tuesday, 21 November 2017.

I.6. Sample Paper formats: Format examples are included below. NOTE: Organizations and agencies within the U.S. government policy process use various formats for papers designed to frame decisions for its strategic leaders. The sample policy paper represented here is not intended to reflect the required format of any particular agency of government. However, for purposes of synthesizing course content, the example provided is similar to papers that might be used within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

DECISION PAPER

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Date XX XXX XX

SUBJECT: **(Hypothetical Example)**. Strategy for Military Assistance to Ukraine

1. **ISSUE:** The President has approved in principle a package of military assistance to Ukraine to allow it to combat Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country. A National Security Council meeting has been scheduled for XX XXX XX to decide the form this assistance will take.

2. **BACKGROUND:** The ongoing separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine has recently expanded, with the cease-fire breaking down and Russian-backed separatists driving on the key port city of Mariupol. The President has authorized an immediate expansion of the U.S. military training mission to Ukraine and has requested options for provision of military equipment to Ukraine. ASD/ISA proposes the following strategy options, each of which has the proposed ends of halting further separatist military advances and stabilizing the conflict to allow the pursuit of a negotiated political settlement.

- a. Expand the ongoing military training mission but do not provide equipment.
- b. Provide defensive weapons only. Defensive weapons are defined here as individual protective equipment, anti-aircraft and anti-armor weapons and counter-artillery radars.
- c. Provide significant military equipment to Ukraine, to include all of the items listed above as well as night vision and communications equipment and armored vehicles.

A decision is requested by XX XXX XX in order to allow ASD/ISA to prepare for the NSC meeting on this issue, scheduled for XX XXX XX.

3. **RECOMMENDATION:** ASD/ISA recommends you select strategy X listed above.
- a. Discuss the suitability of the strategy proposed by explaining how it supports the ends of the policy.
 - b. Briefly discuss the proposed strategy's acceptability to key audiences (Congress, regional allies and partners, the American people, etc.).
 - c. Briefly discuss the feasibility of the strategy by detailing the means required to implement it.
 - d. Discuss and risk inherent in the strategy and how this will be mitigated (or whether the risk can be accepted).

BACKGROUND PAPER

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Date XX XXX XX

SUBJECT: (**Hypothetical Example**). Strategy for Military Assistance to Ukraine

1. **POLICY DECISION AND OBJECTIVES:** On XX XXX XX the President approved in principle a package of military assistance to Ukraine to allow it to combat Russian-backed separatists in the east of the country. A National Security Council meeting has been scheduled for XX XXX XX to decide the form this assistance will take. The stated objectives of this policy are XX, XX, and XX. Given the advance of separatist forces on the key port city of Mariupol, the President wants the expanded package of assistance to begin arriving as soon as possible to provide a visible sign of support to the Ukrainian government.

2. **BACKGROUND / NATIONAL INTERESTS:** A statement of the national interests this strategy will pursue, protect, or advance.

3. **STRATEGY OPTIONS:** A statement of each strategy option, followed by an articulation of the ends, ways, and means inherent in each. Discuss how each strategy option will advance U.S. interests and support the policy decision. Discuss how each strategy proposed would integrate the instruments of national power (DIME), or whether it relies mostly or wholly on a single instrument.

4. **ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF STRATEGY OPTIONS:** Compare each strategy option in terms of its feasibility, acceptability, suitability and risk. When discussing acceptability, ensure to address the strategy option's acceptability to all key audiences (Congress, other executive branch departments and agencies, the media, the American people/interest groups, key allies and partners, others?). Discuss how risk can be mitigated or whether it can be accepted. Discuss the potential reactions of any adversaries to each strategy option, and the potential second and third order effects of each strategy option. Discuss what the indicators might be that the strategy option is in need of revision once it has been implemented.

5. **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend one of the strategy options and explain why it best achieves the stated ends of the policy it is meant to implement. Review the ways and means to be used in the strategy and the instruments of national power to be employed, as well as its advantages over the strategy options not chosen in terms of the SAF-R test and the risk inherent in it.

J. APPENDIX III.

NSPS STUDENT CRITIQUE.

J.1. Analyses of student views of the USAWC courses are an extremely important input to the curriculum planning process. The course evaluation consists of a computer-assisted questionnaire. You can access the computerized survey system through the Student drop down menu on the USAWC Homepage.

J.2. You will be contacted via email once the computer survey is available, and you will be notified of the desired completion date at that time. Questions on the survey should be directed to the Director of Curriculum Evaluation, 245-3365.

J.3. The stated objectives of “National Security Policy and Strategy” are on page 2 of the Course Directive. For your convenience, they are listed below. Please review them prior to completing the course evaluation survey.

J.3.a. Analyze the process of national security policy and strategy formulation and the major factors that influence this process.

J.3.b. Analyze and understand contemporary and emerging international security challenges and their impact on the national security agenda.

J.3.c. Synthesize key concepts, tools, and processes in the development of appropriate policy and strategy responses to national security challenges facing the United States in the 21st Century international security environment.

K. APPENDIX IV.

USAWC PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES.

K.1. Mission. Produce strategic leaders and ideas invaluable to the Army, Joint Force, and Nation.

K.2. AY18 Institutional Learning Outcome

K.2.a. Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression and, when necessary, achieve victory in war. In pursuit of these goals, they study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

K.2.b. Achieving the outcomes requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

K.2.b.1. Theory of war and peace

K.2.b.2. U.S. national security policy, processes, and management

K.2.b.3. Military and unified theater operations

K.2.b.4. Command and leadership

K.2.c. And the ability and commitment to:

K.2.c.1. Think critically, creatively, and strategically.

K.2.c.2. Frame national security challenges in their historical, social, political, and economic contexts.

K.2.c.3. Promote a military culture that reflects the values and ethic of the Profession of Arms.

K.2.c.4. Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.

K.2.c.5. Advance the intellectual, moral, and physical development of oneself and one's subordinates.

K.3. AY18 PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

K.3.a. The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes PLOs that delineate critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic land power.

K.3.b. To accomplish this mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:

K.3.b.1. PLO 1: Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision making.

K.3.b.2. PLO 2: Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.

K.3.b.3. PLO 3: Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.

K.3.b.4. PLO 4: Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

K.3.b.5. PLO 5: Think critically and creatively in addressing security issues at the strategic level.

K.3.b.6. PLO 6: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

L. APPENDIX V.

JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II).

The REP and DEP curricula address requirements for JLAs and JLOs derived from CJCSI 1800.01E, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), 29 May 2015.

L.1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions, and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

L.2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

L.3. Learning Area 1 - National Strategies.

L.3.a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

L.3.b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

L.3.c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

L.3.d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

L.3.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies.

L.4. Learning Area 2 - Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy, and Campaigning for Traditional and Irregular Warfare in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment.

L.4.a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

L.4.b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

L.4.c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns.

L.4.d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

L.4.e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

L.4.f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyberspace operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

L.5. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

L.5.a. Analyze how DOD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate, and apply national ends, ways and means.

L.5.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

L.5.c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

L.5.d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts.

L.5.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct, and assess operations.

L.6. Learning Area 4 - Command. Control and Coordination.

L.6.a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

L.6.b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

L.6.c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

L.7. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

L.7.a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment.

L.7.b. Evaluate critical strategic thinking, decision-making, and communication by strategic leaders.

L.7.c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

L.7.d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

L.7.e. Evaluate historic and contemporary applications of the elements of mission command by strategic-level leaders in pursuit of national objectives.

L.7.f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

L.7.g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.

M. APPENDIX VI.

AY 18 THEMES.

M.1. ENDURING THEMES

M.1.a. Elihu Root's challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

M.2. ENDURING THEMES ACROSS THE CORE CURRICULUM:

M.2.a. Strategic Leadership and the exercise of discretionary judgment

M.2.a.1. Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)

M.2.a.2. Understand the profession's national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice

M.2.a.3. Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations

M.2.a.4. Evaluate strategic thinking about the future

M.2.a.5. Analyze the framework for leading and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change

M.2.b. Relationship of Policy and Strategy (relationship between ends, ways, and means)

M.2.b.1. Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars

M.2.b.2. Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims

M.2.b.3. Analyze how to resource national security

M.2.b.4. Evaluate international relations as the context for national security.

M.2.c. Instruments of national power and potential contributions to national security

M.2.c.1. Comprehend Diplomatic Power

M.2.c.2. Comprehend Informational power

M.2.c.3. Evaluate Military Power

M.2.c.4. Comprehend economic power

M.2.d. Professional ethics

M.2.d.1. Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)

M.2.d.2. Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)

M.2.d.3. Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

M.2.e. Civil-military relations

M.2.e.1. Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership

M.2.e.2. Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society

M.2.e.3. Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

M.2.f. Instruments of war and national security

M.2.f.1. Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)

M.2.f.2. Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments.

M.2.f.3. Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments.

M.2.f.4. Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners.

M.2.g. History as a vehicle for understanding strategic alternatives

M.2.g.1. Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)

M.2.g.2. Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

M.3. ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE)

M.3.a. **National Security Policy and Strategy:** Evaluate Army/landpower and its scope in addressing national security policy aims. Analyze the diversity of landpower requirements over time (hence requirement for flexibility).

**N. APPENDIX VII.
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY. ***

Benjamin Bloom created this taxonomy for categorizing level of abstraction that commonly occurs in educational settings. The taxonomy provides a useful structure in which to categorize learning objectives and questions.

Level	Illustrative Level	Definitions
Knowledge	arrange, define, describe, identify, know, label, list, match, memorize, name, order, outline, recognize, relate, recall, repeat, reproduce, select, state	Remembering previously learned information.
Comprehension	classify, comprehend, convert, define, discuss, distinguish, estimate, explain, express, extend, generalize, give example(s), identify, indicate, infer, locate, paraphrase, predict, recognize, rewrite, report, restate, review, select, summarize, translate	Grasping the meaning of information.
Application	apply, change, choose, compute, demonstrate, discover, dramatize, employ, illustrate, interpret, manipulate, modify, operate, practice, predict, prepare, produce, relate, schedule, show, sketch, solve, use, write	Applying knowledge to actual situations.
Analysis	analyze, appraise, breakdown, calculate, categorize, classify, compare, contrast, criticize, derive, diagram, differentiate, discriminate, distinguish, examine, experiment, identify, illustrate, infer, interpret, model, outline, point out, question, related, select, separate, subdivide, test	Breaking down objects or ideas into simpler parts and seeing how the parts relate and are organized.

Synthesis	arrange, assemble, categorize, collect, combine, comply, compose, construct, create, design, develop, devise, explain, formulate, generate, plan, prepare, propose, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, set up, summarize, synthesize, tell, write	Rearranging component ideas into a new whole.
Evaluating	appraise, argue, assess, attach, choose, compare, conclude, contrast, defend, Evaluating describe, discriminate, estimate, evaluate, explain, judge, justify, interpret, relate, predict, rate, select, summarize, support, value	Making judgments based on internal evidence or external criteria.
Creating	categorize, combine, compile, compose, create, devise, design, explain, generate, modify, organize, plan, rearrange, reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, summarize	Building a structure or pattern from diverse elements.

*Adapted from: Bloom, B.S. (Ed.) (1956) Taxonomy of educational objectives: The classification of educational goals: Handbook I, cognitive domain. New York; Toronto: Longmans, Green.

O. APPENDIX VIII.

OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS, LIBRARY DATABASES, AND BLACKBOARD.

O.1 EZproxy - Enables access to licensed database content when you are not in Root Hall. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

O.2. Links - You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails. Usually, instructors and librarians provide these links so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. It also helps us comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

O.3. Library Databases - You can use EZproxy to access Library databases when you are away from Root Hall. Go to the Library's webpage <http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch, and then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

O.4. Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or you are accessing a particular database, you will be prompted to provide a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-4288 or email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil. You can also access the library portal from the Army War College homepage: <https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/Pages/default.aspx>. Please do not share EZproxy login information with others.

O.5. Impact of Firewalls - Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

ACCESS SOLUTIONS.

O.6. Try Again! Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

O.7. Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can find the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library's webpage

<http://usawc.libguides.com/current>, click on the database name, type in your EZproxy username and password to login, and then search for the specific article.

O.8. Browsers - EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but problems may be caused by your browser if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow popups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

O.9. Databases - Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time.

O.10. Help and Tips - For assistance, please contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email: usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.libraryr@mail.mil.

O.11. Blackboard Access – All syllabus and digitally available media will be made available at Blackboard.com at <https://proedchallenge.blackboard.com/webapps/login/?action=relogin>, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.

P. APPENDIX IX.

PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES CURRICULUM MAP.

SSL REP NSPS Lesson Crosswalk with PLO's, AY18

Program Learning Outcomes		PLO 1: Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decisionmaking.	PLO 2: Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.	PLO 3: Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.	PLO 4: Evaluate the nature, concepts and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.	PLO 5: Think critically and creatively in addressing national security issues at the strategic level.	PLO 6: Communicate clearly, persuasively and candidly.
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY (NSPS)							
NSPS-1-S	INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY	X	X			X	X
NSPS-2-S	INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING: THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER	X				X	X
NSPS-3-L/S	INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER	X				X	X
NSPS-4-S	DOMESTIC IMPACTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING: U.S. HISTORY, VALUES, AND INTERESTS	X				X	X
NSPS-5-S	NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING MODELS	X			X	X	X
NSPS-6-S	CASE STUDY I: CONTAINMENT AND NSC 68	X			X	X	X
NSPS-7-S	THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM I: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE NSC	X				X	X
NSPS-8-S	THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING	X	X			X	X
NSPS-9-S	THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM II: CONGRESS AND INTEREST GROUPS	X				X	X
NSPS-10-L/S	CASE STUDY II: ESCALATION IN VIETNAM	X			X	X	X
NSPS-11-S	INTRODUCTION TO THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER	X				X	X
NSPS-12-L/S	INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN TIMES OF PEACE	X				X	X
NSPS-13-S	INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN CRISIS	X				X	X
NSPS-14-S	INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN CONFLICT: THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ	X				X	X
NSPS-15-S	NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE & POSTURE	X	X			X	X
NSPS-16-S	THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	X	X			X	X
NSPS-17-L/S	21ST CENTURY AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY	X	X			X	X
NSPS Totals		17	5	0	3	17	17

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